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Yksi yleisimpiä koko risteilylaivaa uhkaavia onnettomuuksia on tulipalo. Uusien risteily-
laivojen koko jatkaa kasvuaan. Kun risteilylaivojen koko kasvaa, niin kasvaa laivalla ole-
vien matkustajien lukumääräkin. Suurempi ihmismäärä laivalla johtaa suurempaan ris-
kiin katastrofaalisessa onnettomuudessa. Yleisesti hyväksytty kanta on, että suurempi ris-
teilylaiva tarkoittaa suurempaa riskiä. Toisaalta suuremmalla risteilylaivalla on suurempi
mahdollisuus selviytyä onnettomuudesta ja toimia itsessään parhaana pelastusveneenä,
niin kuin on tarkoituskin.
Toinen huomionarvoinen asia on, että risteilylaivan koon kasvaessa sen kokonaisvaltai-
sen palotuvallisuuden käsitteleminen hankaloituu ja siihen liittyvien riskien käsitys hä-
märtyy. Edellisiin kohtiin perustuen havaittiin tarve työkalulle, jolla voitaisiin arvioida ja
verrata risteilylaivojen kokonaisvaltaista paloturvallisuutta.
Tämän diplomityön aikana kehitettiin työkalu, jolla voidaan qvantifioida risteilylaivan
kokonaisvaltainen paloturvallisuustaso niin, että sitä voidaan verrata muiden vastaavien
risteilylaivojen paloturvallisuustasoon. Malli perustuu paloriski-indeksiin. Malli sisältää
kolme moduulia, jotka arvioidaan erikseen; paloturvallisuus-, evakuointi- ja selviytymis-
moduuli. Moduuleista saadut pistemäärät painotetaan merkitsevyyskertoimella ja tulok-
sena on kokonaisvaltainen paloturvallisuusindeksi.
Paloturvallisuus- ja selviytymismoduulit toimivat suunnitellusti. Pelastusveneisiin siirty-
misen mallintaminen mallille sopivalla tavalla osoittautui haastavaksi, minkä takia eva-
kuointimoduulin viimeisteleminen jätettiin työn seuraavaan vaiheeseen. Joitakin mallin
osia tarvitsee käsitellä tulevaisuudessa tarkemmin uudelleen.
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Abstract
Fire is one of the most common threatening accidents onboard a cruise ship. As cruise
ship sizes are growing, as well as the number of passengers onboard, so does the risk in
catastrophic accidents. It is widely believed, that larger cruise ships oppose bigger risks.
On the other hand, a larger ship has a greater potential to survive accidents and to perform
its duty as the best lifeboat itself.
Another aspect of growing cruise ship size is that the perception of the overall fire safety
level of the ship becomes difficult to assess, and the perception of the risks involved di-
minishes. From previous points, a need for a tool, which could be used for assessing and
comparing holistic fire safety levels of cruise ships, was recognized.
In this master’s thesis, a model was developed to quantify the overall fire safety level of a
cruise ship in a manner that enables comparison between fire safety levels of other cruise
ships. The model is based on the fire risk indexing method. The model consists of three
modules: fire safety, evacuation and resilience, which are evaluated and scored inde-
pendently. These scores are then weighted, and the overall fire safety score of the ship is
obtained.
Fire safety and the resilience modules function as intended. Finalizing of the evacuation
module was left out for future work due to difficulty in assessing embarkation reliably
with a method suitable for the model. Some parts of the model should be reassessed and
looked into in more depth.
Keywords Fire safety, Fire risk index, Cruise ship safety, Multi-attribute evaluation
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7Symbols
α [kW/s2] Fire growth coefficient
ρ [g/m3] Density
τ Decay scaling parameter
τ [s] Time constant
β Combustion efficiency factor
φ Percentage of fire load consumed before decay phase
Ao [m2] Area of opening
AT [m2] Total surface area of the compartment
A [m2] Floor area
a Constant
CHF [kW/m2] Critical heat flux
cp [kJ/g∙K] Specific heat
D [m] Diameter of pool fire
D [pers/m2] Population density
E [min] Embarkation
FBSP Fire brigade success probability
Fc [pers/s] Calculated flow
Fs [pers/s/m] Specific flow
f Frequency of ignition
H [m] Height from fire base to ceiling
Hi [[MJ/kg] Heat of combustion of material i
Ho [m] Height of opening
hk [kW/m2∙K] Effective heat transfer coefficient
k [kW/m∙K] Thermal conductivity
k Constant that depends on water mass flux (Sprinklers)
k Constant (Evacuation)
L [m] Height of pool fire
L [min] Launching time (Evacuation)
ṁa [kg/s] Air mass flow
m [kg] Mass of combustible material
n [min] Time limit for evacuation
n Number of attributes (FRI)
P(Fdi) Probability of flashover in space i, derived from database
P(Fi) Probability of flashover in space i
P(Sdi) Probability of fire spread from space I, derived from database
P(Si) Probability of fire spread from space i
Q% [kW] Heat release rate
FQ% [kW] Heat release rate required for flashover
incQ% [kW] Required heat release rate for sustained burning
maxQ% [kW] Maximum heat release rate
sprQ% [kW] Heat release rate when sprinklers are activated
stoichQ% [kW] Stochiometric heat release rate
( )v
maxQ% [kW] Maximum heat release rate in ventilation controlled fire
"
eq% [kW/m2] External heat flux
8totalq [MJ] Total fire load
R [min] Reaction time
RTI [m1/2s1/2] Response-time index of the sensor
r [m] Radial distance from fire center to detector
ri Normalize value of attribute i
S Fire risk index number
S [m/s] Walking speed (Evacuation)
SAP Sprinkler activation probability
SRL Sprinkler reliability level
s-y Ship-year
T [min] Travel time
TRP [kW∙s1/2/m2] Thermal response parameter
T∞ [°C] Ambient temperature
Tact [s] Time of sprinkler activation
Td [°C] Sensor temperature
Tg [K] Upper layer gas temperature
Tg [°C] Hot gas and flame temperature (Sprinklers)
Tign [K] Ignition temperature
t [s] Time from ignition
td [s] Decay phase start time
tg [s] Growth phase end time
tinc [s] Fire incipient phase length
tresp Response time
t2 t-squared fire
u [m/s] Flow velocity of the hot gases
We [m] Effective width
wi Normalized attribute weight
xi Value of attribute i
xmax Maximum value of xi
xmin Minimum value of xi
y Historical ignition frequency
yi Raw weight of attribute i (FRI)
9Abbreviations
AHP Analytical hierarchy process
ASET Available safe egress time
CFD Computational fluid dynamics
CHF Critical heat flux
CR Consistency ratio
EU European Union
FDS Fire dynamics simulator
FED Fractional effective dose
FRA Fire risk assessment
FRI Fire risk index
FSA Formal Safety Assessment
FSS International Code for Fire Safety Systems
FTP International Code for Application of Fire Test Procedures
HRR Heat release rate
IMO International maritime organization
LHS Latin hypercube sampling
MCDA Multi-criteria decision-making
MES Marine evacuation system
MVZ Main vertical zone
PFS Probabilistic fire simulator
RBD Risk-based design
RMS Royal mail ship
RSET Required safe egress time
SAFEDOR Design, Operation and Regulations for Safety
SOLAS Safety of life at sea
SRTP Safe return to port
TRP Thermal response parameter
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1 Introduction
Cruise ship sizes, measured with any indicator, have grown rapidly during the last decades.
The whole cruise ship industry has grown and evolved, which has led to an increase in com-
petition for customers between cruise lines. This, as well as modern design and production
methods has resulted in larger and more complex technical and architectural designs. As
sizes and complexity of cruise ships grow, perception of overall fire safety level of the ship
diminishes and becomes difficult to rationalize. It is a widely accepted view that as cruise
ship sizes and complexity increases, so does the risks involved and the worst-case societal
loss becomes more unbearable [1]. On the other hand, the current trend and idea behind the
safe-return-to-port  (SRTP)  regulation  is  that  the  ship  itself  is  the  best  lifeboat.  Now  it  is
evident that larger ships, if designed correctly, can take more damage and still stay afloat,
and make their way to the nearest harbor. So, the increasing size of cruise ships bring chal-
lenges and risks, but possibilities as well.
Fire accidents and flooding cover more than 90 % of accidents that lead to loss of life
onboard passenger ships [2]. Eliopoulou et al. [3] investigated safety- and risk levels of
world’s merchant fleet. It was concluded that fire and explosion events are most frequent
accidents leading to total loss of passenger- and cruise ships. The total historical loss fre-
quency of cruise ships due to fire or explosion was calculated to be 4.77E-04. Exactly the
same frequency was observed for passenger fatalities per ship-year. When compared to for-
mer investigations, the frequency of fires and explosions have grown. One explaining factor
was noted to be difficulties in fire control in complex and compartmented spaces, which are
commonly found in today’s ships. It is evident that fire safety is a key factor in cruise ship
design, which should be considered in all decisions.
The fire safety level of a cruise ship is currently built into deterministic rules and regulations.
As a result, the overall fire safety level of the ship is unknown. Another point is that as fire
safety rules are prescriptive, they are seen as a constraint instead of a design feature or a
goal. Due to these realizations, interest towards risk-based fire safety regulations, similar to
probabilistic damage stability rules, have emerged during the past two decades. Such regu-
lations would also enable comparison between fire safety levels of different ships, and, if the
procedure is simple enough, quantification of the effects of different design solutions to fire
safety level of the ship.
Currently the above described risk-based regulations or tools to quantify overall fire safety
level of a cruise ship do not exist. Extensive formal risk assessments (FSA) can be used to
determine good approximation about the overall fire safety level for a given ship. FSA pro-
cesses are, however, laborious and time-consuming and thus cannot be used to systemati-
cally compare fire safety levels of multiple ships, or the effects of different designs to the
fire safety level of the ship under design. The purpose of this thesis is to develop a model,
which would enable such comparisons.
1.1 Research problem and goals
The main goal of this master’s thesis is to develop a model to evaluate holistic overall cruise
ship fire safety and to identify the attributes needed for such a model. The model is intended
to be used in a comparative manner in the concept design phase to evaluate the effect of
different design solutions in the fire safety level of the ship, as well as to compare different
ships with each other. The use in the concept phase sets limitations and requirements for the
development of the model. Firstly, available data is limited, not much is known about the
ship and its’ final form at this phase. Also, designs in the concept phase change quickly and
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often, thus the model should be quick and easy to use. If extensive labor is required, the
model will not be used.
In this master’s thesis the framework and construction of the model, as well as the attributes
that are to be used in the model, are the most important aspects. The model should respond
to design changes in a predictable and meaningful manner. The most relevant attributes
should be adjustable, so that new or improved systems or methods can be taken into account.
However, the model developed in this master’s thesis does not try to form actual, realistic
fire safety assessment or an index, like the FN-curve. As far as applicable at this point, real-
istic historical data, formulation and best practices are used, even though realistic represen-
tation of the fire safety level is not sought after. Realistic representation of overall fire safety
level of the cruise ship is too a large, broad and complex topic to tackle with available re-
sources. Currently, the model is meant for comparative purposes only. Updates to the model
should however be plausible in the future. In the future, the model could be updated and
modified in the direction of a more realistic fire safety assessment.
Based on Meyer Turku’s expert judgement, the model should consider at least the following
attributes:
∂ Fire ignition
∂ Fire spread into adjacent spaces
∂ Evacuation from initial space
∂ Evacuation to assembly stations
∂ Evacuation to lifeboats or to a MES
One important consideration about the scope of the thesis is that the main purpose is to de-
velop the model and the framework around it. Single aspects of the model are addressed in
as much of detail, as time restraints allow. However, producing a functional model is more
important than accuracy and reliability of individual components of the model, at this phase.
The idea is that individual parts of the model can be fine-tuned and improved in the future,
for example as a part of other master’s theses or as a normal work task at Meyer Turku.
1.2 Limitations
Due to the broad nature of the thesis topic and the limited time available for the execution,
multiple limitations are set for the thesis. These limitations are explained and discussed in
this section.
1.2.1 Fire size
After initial familiarization with the subject of the thesis and previous research conducted
on the area, it became clear, that the modelling or simulating of fire spread from compart-
ment to compartment would not be feasible. The number of variables and uncertainties rise
exponentially, if fire spread from compartment to compartment is assessed in application as
the one presented in this thesis.
As a result, only fires in initial compartment are taken into account in the simulations. The
need to assess large fires was recognized as well. Thus, the resilience module was imple-
mented into the model. The resilience module deals with the ship’s operational capability
after large 1 - 2 MVZ fire. Fire sizes, which fall between the fire in initial compartment and
1- 2 MVZ, would require fire spread simulation from compartment to compartment. Not
including mid-scale fire into the model is also supported from the operational point of view.
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The most likely outcome from fire, which destroys the initial compartment, is that the MVZ,
where the compartment is located, is evacuated to adjacent MVZs. Thus, if the fire spreads
to adjacent compartments, the compartment can be assumed to be empty of people. Then
again, the whole ship would be most likely evacuated in case of 1 - 2 MVZ fire, however,
SRTP  regulations  require  that  the  ship  can  sail  to  the  nearest  harbor  after  one  MVZ  has
burned. Based on these assumptions, mid-scale fires are not of biggest interest, as their effect
on ship operation and human safety are not as critical.
1.2.2 The effect of fire on people
At this point it was decided that fire effects on people would not be included in the model.
Thus, no fractional effective dose (FED) calculations or F-N curves would be produced. The
effect on people will most probably be included in the model in future development. Also,
regarding evacuation, no interaction between fire and people would be taken into account.
1.2.3 The effect of fire on structures
The effect of fire on the structures of the ship is not taken into account in the model. The
topic itself is complex and difficult, even if the actual structure is known. Taking the struc-
tural effects of the fire into account in a model that is intended to represent the whole ship
and is used in concept design phase where no structural design is conducted, is merely im-
possible.
1.2.4 Financial aspects
Another limitation is the exclusion of financial aspects of the fire. Assessing the financial
aspects of fires are not of biggest interest from the perspective of the shipyard, which is only
concerned about the safety of persons onboard a ship. Assessing financial outcomes of the
fires would also be difficult within the scope of this thesis. Financial loss caused by a fire is
of course largely depended on the size, location and durability of the fire. In practice, all
sizes of fires should be simulated, including the mid-sized ones, which were excluded from
the scope of the thesis. Also, time restraints of the thesis were considered, when financial
aspect was ruled out from the scope of the thesis.
1.2.5 Intentional fires
Intentionally ignited fires are not included in the scope of the thesis or into the model. Pre-
dicting consequences of intentional fire is even more difficult than those of unintentional
fires. Historical ignition frequencies of course might include some intentional fires, but these
are, however, unlikely. Due to the above-mentioned reasons, intentional fires were ruled out
from the scope of the thesis.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
After the introduction, fire safety onboard a cruise ship is explained in short. Fire safety of
ships will be dealt with in this thesis, thus more emphasis on items, which are relevant to
this thesis are discussed. Some new trends and efforts towards probabilistic fire safety regu-
lations are also dealt with. In the following chapter the theory behind individual components
of the model constructed is explained and commented on. After theory, the scientific meth-
ods, which are used in the model, are explained and their suitability is evaluated.
In the model development chapter, the structure of the model and its components are ex-
plained. Also, implementation of the theory and method in the model are explained for the
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cases where more in-depth explanation is required. Simple applications of formulae are not
dealt with in detail.
Model sensitivity regarding its different main parameters is studied and dealt with in its own
chapter. The purpose is to verify that the model functions logically and satisfies the require-
ments that are set for it. Main interest is in the effect of parameters that can be adjusted based
on the design and components used in the ship in question.
After model sensitivity, future improvements, refinements and add-ons are discussed. Due
to the broad and complex topic of the thesis and given the available time for the execution,
some components and parts of the model could be improved. Improvements are required
especially if actual, realistic fire risk figures would be the goal of the model in the future.
In the discussion chapter some points of the model and process behind it are dealt with.
Finally, in the summary, the process and the results are summarized.
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2 Fire safety onboard a cruise ship
Safety  of  Life  at  Sea  (SOLAS)  [4]  sets  minimum  safety  standards  for  merchant  ships  to
ensure safe operation and navigation. SOLAS sets minimum standards for construction,
equipment  and  operation  for  merchant  ships.  Each  flag  state  that  has  signed  the  SOLAS
agreement is required to ensure that the ships built in each state are built according to the
regulations of SOLAS. As of present, most flag states have outsourced much of this super-
vising to the classification societies. The first version was published in 1914 after the sinking
of RMS Titanic. It has been amended multiple times since. Most often ratifications have
taken place after major accidents. Chapter II-2 - Fire protection, fire detection and fire ex-
tinction set the requirements regarding fire safety. Functional fire safety objectives of SO-
LAS are:
1. Division of the ship into main vertical and horizontal zones by thermal and structural
boundaries
2. Separation of accommodation spaces from the remainder of the ship by thermal and
structural boundaries
3. Restricted use of combustible materials
4. Detection of any fire in the zone of origin
5. Containment and extinction of any fire in the space of origin
6. Protection of means of escape and access for fire fighting
7. Ready availability of fire-extinguishing appliances; and
8. Minimization of possibility of ignition of flammable cargo vapor
Besides direct requirements, Chapter II – 2 obligates to follow the International Code for
Application of Fire Test Procedures (FTP) [5] and the International Code for Fire Safety
Systems (FSS) [6].
The main purpose of the FTP code is to set regulations and requirements for testing and
evaluating parts and components designed to be used in ships. This means that each compo-
nent or part assembled or built into the ship must have a certification that proves that the
item satisfies the FTP code. An alternative procedure for unique designs or solutions is to
individually evaluate the system according to the criteria set by the FTP code. MSC conven-
tion 88 held in 2010 made proceedings of the FTP code mandatory under the Chapter II-2.
FSS is described as follows: “The purpose of this Code is to provide international standards
of specific engineering specifications for fire safety systems required by chapter II-2 of the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, as amended”[6]. In
short, FSS sets strict requirements and standards for fire safety equipment and systems. FSS
concentrates mostly in fire extinguishing systems and fire extinguishing medias used, for
these examples and standards are presented. Despite the strict standards and requirements,
the implementation of modern technology is enabled by allowing alternative designs if
proved equivalent or safer than accepted alternatives. The FSS has been updated several
times, often after major fire on ship accidents.
The above-mentioned documents induce requirements mostly relating to the construction
and outfitting of the ship. SOLAS and its amendments also set requirements for safety man-
agement,  crew  training  and  alertness.  These  human  factors  have  shown  to  be  crucial  for
overall safety and fire safety of the ship. Eliopuolou et al. [7] found that over 80 % of marine
accidents occur due to human factors. It was stated that safety measures addressed, relating
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to ship operation, were far more efficient in reducing accident frequencies, than those relat-
ing to ship construction and equipment onboard. Requirements relating to construction and
equipment were found to have a larger effect on the scale of the accidents.
In general, fire safety can be divided in two categories; active and passive. Active fire safety
systems are reactive attempts to prevent or extinguish the fire, such as automatic fire extin-
guishing systems and the action of firefighters. Passive fire safety systems are measures that
are  built  in  a  building  or  in  a  ship,  which  are  meant  to  prevent  or  to  control  the  fire.  An
example would be dividing boundaries between spaces that prevent fire from spreading from
space of ignition to adjacent spaces.
Fire safety systems required by the above-mentioned documents can also be divided in active
and passive systems. Active fire safety systems include automatic fire detection and alarm,
sprinkler systems and actions of onsite crew staff and actions of the crew fire brigade. Pas-
sive systems include everything from evacuation and fire control plans to sub-divisioning of
the ship by fire categorized bulkheads and decks. Also, the amount of combustibles is limited
by the SOLAS space categorization. This controls the ignition frequency and the intensity
of the plausible fire.
2.1 Current trends
Modern technology and design tools enable novel and innovative solutions and designs,
which are not in line with prescriptive rules, but are equally, or even more safe. In order to
enable such solutions and designs, Guidelines on Alternative Design and Arrangements for
Fire Safety were published in MSC/Circular 1002 [8]. These guidelines enable the usage of
performance-based design. The basic principle is that the design team must prove by engi-
neering  analysis  that  their  design  is  as  safe,  of  safer  than  a  comparable  design,  which  is
compliant with prescriptive rules. If no comparable design can be found, the procedure re-
quires the design team to perform safety analyses in order to prove the safety of the design.
In the case of a space on the ship, the purpose of the analysis is to ensure that the design
enables evacuation of the space in question with no casualties in every fire scenario. De-
pending on the application and difficulty of the alternative design, various levels of ac-
ceptance procedures are used. Each alternative design is treated case by case.
Interest in more goal-based safety regulations has been evident. It is thought that more goal-
based regulations would enforce new and innovative solutions and enable the use of safety
as a design parameter instead of a constraint. The probabilistic damage stability concept was
the first attempt towards goal-based regulations. In the early 1960’s, the probabilistic dam-
age stability concept was introduced for the first time by Kurt Wendel. The concept gained
big interest and acceptance and was developed further and interpreted as an alternative dam-
age stability approach for deterministic rules for passenger ships in 1974. The method was
implemented as mandatory in the SOLAS in 2009. Wendel’s concept acted as an initiating
event for the interest in risk-based design (RBD). [9]. Probabilistic damage stability calcu-
lations can be thought of as a as a way of quantifying the ship’s stability performance index
in the context of hull damage case. As such, Wendel’s concept was first attempted in quan-
tifying a specific ship-level risk.
Interest in other similar goal-based rules has been on the table as well. The European Union
(EU)-funded research project Design, Operation and Regulations for Safety (SAFEDOR),
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was initiated to develop a risk-based regulatory framework. The need for a risk-based regu-
latory framework was realized as old deterministic rules prevented new and innovative, but
safe, solutions that modern state-of-the-art design and analysis methods made possible. An-
other key point of SAFEDOR was also to introduce safety as an objective of design instead
of a constraint. [10].
Even though fire safety was a part of the SAFEDOR, afterwards another EU-funded research
project, FIREPROOF, was initiated. The aim of the project was to develop the basis and the
procedures for probabilistic fire safety regulations, similar to probabilistic damage stability
rules. The project was divided in four work packages: scenario generation; consequence as-
sessment; implementation and benchmarking; and probabilistic fire safety regulations [11].
From these, so far only the first two were addressed during the active phase of the project
[11]. The results and findings of relevant parts from SAFEDOR and FIREPROOF are more
discussed later, under their specific topics.
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3 Methods
In this section the methods used in the model development are presented.
3.1 Fire risk indexing
Fire risk indexing (FRI), also known as risk ranking, point schemes, numerical grading and
rating schedules, is a heuristic method for addressing fire safety. It is cited as a link between
fire science and fire safety. FRI is a form of multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA). The
idea of FRI is to create a single index number which reflects the relative fire safety level of
the system. This index number is then compared to other designs, or to a standard. In many
applications some knowledge in and understanding of the fire safety level of the system is
required, but formal quantitative fire risk assessment (FRA) is not a sensible option due to
financial  or  timely  resources.  In  these  applications  FRI  can  offer  a  meaningful  and  cost-
effective, but a little less sophisticated alternative. FRI also enables a straightforward way
of implementing qualitative attributes to the evaluation. [12]. Despite the lack of sophistica-
tion required for formal FRA, indexing is considered valuable and an efficient method for
decision-making, should more detailed fire risk analysis be needed [13].
Modern multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) originates from operational research and
management science. MCDA is a widely accepted and researched method in aiding decision-
making and design-comparison, but it has its limitations of course. MCDA tries to offer tools
for problems, where multiple attributes need to be weighted and considered in decision-
making  or  in  design.  In  a  real-world  application,  data  and  information  are  often  limited,
incomplete or sparse, or a combination of these. In addition, some of the attributes are fa-
vorable and some are negative considering the end goal. Dealing with such data is one of the
key aspects of MCDA. Dealing with the type of data mentioned above is present in most
fields  of  society,  which  has  led  to  a  broad  number  of  applications  of  MCDA.  Insurance,
financial and risk-related fields e.g., widely use MCDA. [14]. Due to a vast number of dif-
ferent applications, a great variety of methods and tools have been developed. Only some of
these are applicable in FRI context. In this chapter only aspects of MCDA relating to FRI
are discussed.
3.1.1 Generalized fire index procedure
FRI methods vary in structure, methods and applicability, as each application have their own
attributes, attribute weightings and focuses. The focus, or the end goal of FRI can be, for
example, financial loss, safety of human life, property loss or a combination of these. Due
to the nature of FRI, each method or process has been developed for a specific purpose for
a specific application. A method for a holistic passenger ship FRI has not been presented at
the time of writing this thesis.
Watts [15] presented generalized procedure for the construction of FRI in a building envi-
ronment, which is used as a reference in this section, if not mentioned otherwise. Later in
SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering [12], Watts simplified the procedure steps
to a more general format. Watts’ generalized procedure explains well and in a simple manner
the idea and execution of FRI. The original generalized procedure for FRI in building envi-
ronment is presented below, as it is more explanatory and describes the attributes that are
also present in this master’s thesis.
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Step 1. Identify the set of attributes that characterize fire safety in the group of buildings to
be evaluated.
Step 2. Develop an importance weight for each attribute.
Step 3. Develop methods for assigning values to each attribute for each building.
Step 4. Select evaluation model.
Step 5. Validate and calibrate the evaluation procedure.
First, attributes that will be used in FRI are selected. These attributes depend on the applica-
tion and should be selected carefully. Attributes can vary from ignition frequency, fire sup-
pression systems to population within the premises and average evacuation distance. As of,
attributes can be positive or negative in relation to fire risk. Watts states that “Selection of
attributes should result in a set that is nonconflicting, coherent and logical.”, and “In the
final analysis, it is most important that the evaluation vector include only those attributes
that vary significantly among the buildings and for which the variation is considered mean-
ingful.”. This means that the attribute list should not include attributes that only single, or a
few of the compared systems possesses. Nor should it include attributes that are irrelevant
from the fire risk perspective.
Next, an importance weight for each attribute is generated. In relation to fire safety and in
focus of the FRI, all attributes are not equally important. By developing weighed values for
each attribute, the importance of each attribute in relation to others is determined. This makes
weight  value  generation  a  crucial  part  of  the  FRI.  Watts  also  states  that  attribute  weights
should be normalized to sum to one, for which the following formulae is used:
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Where: wi = Normalized attribute weight
yi = Raw weight of attribute i
n = Number of attributes
There are numerous ways to determine weight values for attributes. It should be kept in mind
that weight value determination procedures should be systematic and logical, and they
should reflect the fire safety goals of the FRI.
In the third step, procedures for assigning values to attributes is developed. The value of an
attribute reflects the scale of the effect of the attribute to the fire safety of the system. As
mentioned before, the effect can be positive or negative. In order to enable comparison be-
tween different attributes, all attributes must be quantified into numerical form. Quantitative
measures are easy to express in numbers. In order to enable the comparison of qualitative
attributes between other qualitative and quantitative attributes, some sort of scaling process
is needed. Likert scale [16] is widely used, where attributes are scaled from 1 to 5, where 1
is the most negative and 5 is the most positive grade. When determining which number each
19
attribute is assigned, expert judgement, Delphi exercise, or some structured method like An-
alytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) or decision tables, for example, can be used.
As quantitative attributes generally have different units of measure, attributes must be nor-
malized  to  a  dimensionless  form.  Watts  states  that  general  linear  normalization  is  mostly
used, which can be expressed as:
min
max min
i
i
x xr
x x
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(3)
Where: ri = Normalize value of attribute i
xi = Value of attribute i
xmin = Minimum value of xi
xmax = Maximum value of xi
If minimum value of xi is 0, then normalized value is obtained as:
max
i
i
xr
x
< (4)
When quantitative values are normalized, they vary between 0 and 1. To enable comparison
between quantitative and qualitative values, normalized quantitative values must be multi-
plied with the maximum number of the scale used for qualitative attributes. So, if Likert
scale from 1 to 5 is used for qualitative attributes, the normalized quantitative values need
to be multiplied with the value 5. Another option is to divide quantitative values with the
value 5, which causes values to vary between 0 and 1. The goal in both methods is to enable
straight numerical comparison between qualitative and quantitative attributes.
Actual FRI is then calculated using attained attribute values and weights. Several methods
for calculating final index number exist. The most simple one is additive weight method,
where a normalized value of an attribute is multiplied with the weight of the attribute and all
attained values are summed. Additive weight method can be expressed as:
n
i iS w r<  (5)
Where: S = Fire risk index number
3.2 Analytical hierarchy process
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) was developed by Saaty in 1980 [17]. AHP is a tool for
generating ratios or importance factors. The main idea behind the AHP is that it can be used
to compare qualitative and quantitative attributes, which is otherwise difficult or impossible
in a rational manner. AHP can be used in many various applications, but it has been most
common in multi-criteria analyses, planning, resource allocation and in conflict resolution.
[18]. In this thesis AHP will be used for the generation of FRI attribute weight values, thus
AHP is explained from the viewpoint of multi-criteria analysis. The key item in this thesis
is to compare quantitative and qualitative attributes, which led to the use of AHP.
AHP is  a  straightforward  process.  In  a  simple  case  of  generation  of  weighing  factors  for
attributes, each attribute is compared to other attributes in pairwise comparisons on a prede-
fined scale, using an evaluation matrix. The scale to be used in the comparison is presented
below, in Table 1. The scale was created by Saaty in his original work. It has been widely
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used ever since in AHP applications [18]. An illustrative comparison matrix is presented in
Table 2. The comparison is a matter of preference. The person comparing the attributes
chooses which attribute is more favored and how much over the other. In practice, this means
that the person doing the evaluation should possess extensive knowledge and experience in
the subject under consideration. One approach is also to ask multiple professionals to per-
form the same evaluation and then find similarities or averages from the collected answers.
Table 1. The fundamental scale, reproduced and simplified from [18].
Intensity of im-
portance on an
absolute scale
Definitions Explanation
1 Equal importance Two activities contribute equallyto the objective
3 Moderate importance of one over an-other
Experience and judgment
strongly favor one activity over
another
5 Essential or strong importance
Experience and judgment
strongly favor one activity over
another
7 Very strong importance
An activity is strongly favored,
and its dominance demon-
strated in practice
9 Extreme importance
The evidence favoring one activ-
ity over another is of the highest
possible order of affirmation
2.4.6.8 Intermediate values between the twoadjacent judgements When compromise is needed
Reciprocals
If activity i has one of the above num-
bers assigned to it when compared with
activity j, then j has the reciprocal value
when compared with i
Rationals Rations arising from the scale
If consistency were to be forced
by obtaining n numerical values
to span the matrix
Even finer scale 1.1, 1.2…, can be used if compared elements are closer than indicated by the
scale
In the matrix, each attribute is compared, and preference of one attribute over another is
expressed numerically according to the scale provided above. It should be noted, that the
matrix is always symmetric, thus once attributes i and k have been compared, and value have
been given for preference for i over k, say 7, reciprocal 1/7 will be automatically given for
comparison k – i. The matrix is also always an identity matrix, as all its diagonal elements
are formed by the comparisons between the same attribute. The value from comparison k -
k is naturally always 1.
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Table 2. Evaluation matrix.
Attribute i j k n
i 1 1/3 7 1/9
j 3 1 5 1
k 1/7 1/5 1 3
n 9 1 1/3 1
Weight values for different attributes are then calculated by using the eigenvector method.
To simplify the process, the power method is often used. Solving the weight values is ex-
plained more thoroughly in [18]. More detailed description of the power method is presented
in [19].
3.3 Probabilistic fire simulator
Probabilistic fire simulator (PFS) was developed by VTT [20]. PFS is an Excel-based tool,
which generates fire scenarios based on user input. If needed, PFS also automatically gener-
ates  FDS  or  CFAST  input  files  for  each  fire  scenario.  The  core  of  the  tool  is  in  random
sampling of parameters. Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) is mostly used. By assigning
probability distributions for parameters affecting the fire scenario and selecting values ran-
domly from the distributions, probabilistic calculations can be made. PFS does not have any
pre-built fire models. The user needs to create the fire scenarios, i.e. mathematically model
the fire scenarios and determine the parameters to be sampled. Once the mathematical model
is constructed, the user can determine the amount of iterations.
As a part of this thesis, PFS workbook was built. In the workbook, compartment fire phe-
nomena are mathematically modelled, including the effects of suppressive actions. The PFS
creates the pre-determined amount of design fires. When some measurable objectives are
determined, and whether the objective was realized or not within each simulation, the out-
come is recorded and a certain type of database is created. Based on this database, probabil-
ities of occurrences of the measured objectives can be derived. In the above-described way,
PFS  is  used  to  create  a  database  of  outcomes  from  different  fires,  which  is  then  used  to
determine probabilities of threatening fire events within spaces onboard a cruise ship. In the
following sections 4 - 4.3 the mathematical modelling of fire is discussed in more detail.
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4 Theory and previous research
In this section relevant previous research related to similar holistic fire safety models and
individual components of the developed model are presented.
The presented ignition frequencies are obtained from statistics of cruise ship fires. Compart-
ment fire modeling formulae is obtained from land-based applications. It should be noted,
that most formulae, especially the ones concerning fully grown fires and flashovers, are not
designed or verified for modeling fires in large spaces, like atriums found in cruise ships. In
this thesis, the presented formulae are used for all spaces onboard. In the future development,
if new formulae or alternative methods are available, a more suitable approach for large
spaces should be adopted.
4.1 Fire ignition frequency
Fire ignition frequencies onboard passenger- and cruise ships have been studied in multiple
researches [7,21,22]. Ignition frequency is commonly assessed by using historical statistics.
Ventikos [22] performed comprehensive statistical analysis on fire incidents and accidents
as a part of the FIREPROOF research project. The analysis included 1521 records and covers
463 ship-years of passenger- and cruise ship operation. The results are discussed in the orig-
inal document, but are analyzed more thoroughly in the FIREPROOF report [23], which
presents the ignition model developed for the project. Guarin [24] carried out similar review
of historical cruise ship fire accident and incident data. Fire ignition occurrences for the top
ten spaces with highest ignition frequencies, based on the use of the space, are presented
below. The results from Ventikos are presented in Figure 1 and the results from Guarin in
Figure 2. The results from both reviews are quite similar with exceptions on public spaces
and corridors. It can be concluded, that the pareto principle holds true well for fire ignitions.
About 80 % of fires originates from roughly 20 % of spaces [24].
Figure 1. Relative frequency of occurrence, FIREPROOF, reproduced from [23].
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Figure 2. Relative frequency of occurrence, Guarin, reproduced from [24].
Each space onboard a ship is categorized according to SOLAS space categories, presented
in Table 3. As the categories reflect certain types of spaces, and are designed with the fire
risk in mind, in the literature, ignition frequencies are most often expressed individually for
each SOLAS space category.
Table 3. SOLAS space categories, reproduced from [4].
Number Definition
1 Control station
2 Stairway
3 Corridors
4 Evacuation station and external escape routes
5 Open deck spaces
6 Accommodation spaces for minor fire risk
7 Accommodation spaces for moderate fire risk
8 Accommodation spaces for greater fire risk
9 Sanitary, and similar spaces
10 Tanks, voids and auxiliary machinery spaces having little or no fire risk
11 Auxiliary machinery spaces, cargo spaces, cargo and other oil tanks andother similar spaces of moderate fire risk
12 Machinery spaces and main galleys
13 Store-rooms, workshops, pantries, etc.
14 Other spaces in which flammable liquids are stowed
Typically, when ignition frequency is derived for a single space, the floor area of the space
is incorporated in the mathematical formulation [24-26]. The way how the floor area is im-
plemented varies. Guarin [24] introduced the formulation shown in Equation 6, which
simply multiplies the floor area of the space with SOLAS category-specific ignition fre-
quency per unit area. Themelis et al. [23] use the same formulation, however, based on large
example cruise ships, they found that there is very little correlation with fire ignition fre-
quency and the floor area of a given space. In a building-based study, Tillander obtained
16,7 % 16,0 %
9,9 % 9,2 %
8,0 %
6,0 %
4,6 %
3,4 % 2,8 % 2,7 %
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similar results, which are in agreement with the assumption that the fire ignition frequency
is not linearly depended on the floor area of the space in question [25]. To overcome the
issue with the lack of correlation, Themelis et al. derived equation 7. The equation uses the
typical floor area of each SOLAS category space. Typical floor areas were calculated indi-
vidually for each example ship. It was observed, that Rayleigh distribution fits well to the
distribution of floor areas of different spaces within the same SOLAS category. From Ray-
leigh distributions, the 50-th percentile was selected to present a typical floor area. As Ray-
leigh distribution is asymmetric, the 50-th percentile does not mean the average floor area,
but usually a slightly larger area. As a result, three ignition frequencies per SOLAS category
space were obtained. From these three, the highest value was selected to be used in the cal-
culations. The selected ignition frequencies were compared against the values obtained from
the building industry’s spaces for similar uses. The comparison revealed some contradicto-
ries amongst the ignition frequencies. Further work with validation was proposed. [23].
i i if y A< (6)
Where: fi = Frequency of ignition in a specific space
yi = Historical ignition frequency of given SOLAS category space per unit area
Ai = Floor area of the specific space
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Where: γi = Historical frequency of ignition per SOLAS category (ignition frequency
/ s-y / m2)
s-y = Ship-year
ni = Number of spaces of SOLAS category i
Expected ignition frequencies, derived from FIREPROOF database and ignition frequencies
calculated using equation 7 and procedure described above, are presented in Table 4.
Table 4. Ignition frequencies [23].
SOALS space category Number of occurrences
Expected Fre-
quency of ignition /
s-y
Selected ignition fre-
quency γ [s-y / m2]
1 0 0.000 0.000E+00
2 23 0.050 4.547E-05
3 52 0.112 3.880E-05
4 11 0.024 0.000E+00
5 72 0.155 6.804E-05
6 315 0.680 7.905E-05
7 19 0.041 6.156E-05
8 192 0.415 1.007E-04
9 55 0.119 3.216E-04
10 10 0.022 1.302E-05
11 0 0.000 0.000E+00
12 642 1.386 8.012E-04
13 126 0.272 2.022E-04
14 4 0.009 2.622E-04
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It should be noted, that the ignition frequencies presented above do not take into account the
severity of fire. Most of the ignited fires are suppressed by the crew even before the alarm is
activated.
4.2 Fire within space of ignition
Fire within a compartment can be divided in four phases; growth, flashover, fully developed
and decay. The following explanation includes an assumption that no effort to suppress the
fire is taken. The growth phase starts with an incipient phase, where the fire grows linearly
into state, where it can sustain independent burning. Fizgerald [27] determined that self-
sustaining fire is about 20 kW, which corresponds to about 25 cm flame height. After reach-
ing independent burning, depending on the burning material and ventilation conditions, fire
grows exponentially. If a sufficient amount of fuel and oxygen is available, a flashover even-
tually occurs, and fire will develop into a fully developed phase. In a fully developed phase,
fire  will  burn  as  oxygen  or  fuel-surface  controlled  with  relatively  constant  HRR.  After  a
critical amount of fuel load has been consumed, the decay phase starts. The development
can be seen in the form of an HRR curve below, in Figure 3. [28]. In the following subchap-
ters, each phase will be addressed in more detail.
Figure 3. Compartment fire development [28].
4.2.1 Fuel load
Fuel load describes the amount of energy that would be released in a perfect combustion of
all combustibles within the compartment. The temperature during the fire depends heavily
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on the fuel load within the compartment, thus assessing fuel load is important when time-
temperature curves are assessed. [29].
The fuel load depends on the mass and net heat of combustion values of the items in the
compartment. Net heat of combustion depends on calorific value of the material in question.
Fuel load density will be used in the model. Fuel load density q is obtained as shown in
equation 8. [29].
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Where: mi = Mass of combustible material i [kg]
Hi = Heat of combustion of material i [MJ/kg]
A = Floor area of the compartment [m2]
The total fuel load within the compartment is the one obtained using equation 9.
Q q A< √ (9)
As fires are assumed to be oxygen-controlled in the model, the fuel load of the compartment
affects only in length of the fire. If the fires would be modelled as fuel-surface-controlled,
the HRR development would also be fuel load depended.
4.2.2 Incipient phase
Ignition can be piloted or spontaneous. In piloted ignition the external heat flux is present,
which then ignites a component or components within the compartment. In spontaneous ig-
nition the heat accumulates within an object or on a surface, leading to a longer incipient
phase.
When ignition has occurred, heat flux is established. Ignition within a compartment does not
necessarily lead to flaming combustion. For example, depending on the material, a cigarette
might ignite smoldering fire, which decays before flaming combustion is achieved. A heat
release rate of 20 kW corresponds to approximately 25 cm flaming fire, which can be con-
sidered as self-sustaining fire [30].
The length of the incipient phase depends on the power of the ignition source; materials and
conditions within the compartment and mainly on the availability of oxygen. Even though
the heat release rate during the incipient stage does not threaten the compartment, toxic gases
can be produced, which can affect occupants [23]. Also, depending on the type of the incip-
ient phase, it can also affect detection times of heat or smoke detectors.
When  the  ignitability  of  solid  materials  is  addressed,  they  can  be  classified  as  thermally
“thin” or “thick”. Most of the materials found onboard ships can be taken as thermally
“thick”. [31]. Tewarson [32] presented a straightforward method to calculate the length of
the incipient phase for thermally “thick” materials. The method is based on solving the re-
quired  time to  heat  an  object  above  its  critical  heat  flux  (CHF).  Once  the  CHF has  been
reached, the object starts to burn. The CHF of individual materials or objects can be tested
using heat release rate apparatuses. The length of the incipient phase, tinc can be approxi-
mated using equation 10. When a solid is heated, the rate at which heat transfers to materials
depends on multiple material-specific parameters. These parameters are taken into account
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in the thermal response parameter (TRP). The TRP of a given material is calculated with
equation 11.
2
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Where: CHF = Critical heat flux [kW/m2]
TRP = Thermal response parameter [kW∙s1/2/m2]
"
eq%  = External heat flux [kW/m2]
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Where: ∆Tign = Difference between ambient and ignition temperature [K]
cp = Material specific heat [kJ/g∙K]
k = Material thermal conductivity [kW/m∙K]
ρ = density of material [g/m3]
4.2.3 Growth phase
Multiple parameters affect the growth rate of the fire. More precise calculations can be done,
when the materials of burning items, their location, space geometry and ventilation factors
are known. Such detailed information will not be available for this tool, thus a more general
concept of fire growth is assessed.
A generally accepted method to describe the growth of most fires, is the so called t2 fire,
where HRR grows exponentially as a function of time. HRR of t2 fire can be calculated as
shown in equation 12. Parameter α is selected from Table 5 based on geometry and contents
within the compartment. Determining fire growth rate as t2 fire using parameter α is a prac-
tical engineering assumption. [32-34].
2( )incQ t t< ,% (12)
Where: Q%  = Heat release rate [kW]
α = Fire growth coefficient [kW/s2]
t = Time from ignition [s]
Table 5. Parameters used for “tsquared fires”, reproduced from [33].
Description Typical scenario α [kW/s2]
SLOW Densely packed paper productsa 0.00293
MEDIUM Traditional mattress/boxspring
a
Traditional armchair 0.01172
FAST PU Mattress (horizontal)
a
PE pallets, stacked 1m high 0.0469
ULTRAFAST High rack storage PE rigid foamstacked 5m high 0.1876
aNational Fire Protection Association (2010) [34].
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4.2.4 Flashover prediction
A flashover can be defined as: “The rapid transition to a state of total surface involvement
in a fire of combustible materials within an enclosure.” [35]. The flashover is an important
transitional period, as it is often considered as a state, where the enclosure is completely
untenable, and fire cannot be suppressed without proficient fire brigade. Only a small portion
of fires develop into flashover. For a flashover to occur, a sufficient amount of fuel and
oxygen must be present. Whether a flashover occurs depends also on compartment geometry
and thermal properties of the walls and other materials present. Usually automatic or manual
extinguishing systems can control the fire sufficiently enough to prevent the growth into
flashover, or fire becomes oxygen limited before flashover, even if enough fuel would be
present. [36] The rest of this subchapter discusses a case, where conditions enable fire
growth to flashover.
In light of this thesis, whether flashover can occur or not, and if it can, the time to reach it
are of interest.
The  occurrence  of  flashover  is  conditional  to  ventilation  conditions.  After  flashover,  fire
reaches  a  fully-grown state.  As  fully  grown,  compartment  fire  is  usually  oxygen limited.
Generally, it is assumed that in the case of compartment fire, oxygen is supplied through a
door or a window. Windows are assumed to break when fire nears flashover. Air flow
through an opening can be approximated with equation 13. [37] This approximation is used
in the following methods to approximate the HRR required for flashover.
0.5a o om A H<% (13)
Where: ṁa = Air mass flow into the compartment [kg/s]
Ao = Area of opening [m2]
Ho = Height of opening [m]
Thomas [38] presented a method to evaluate the required HRR to reach flashover within the
compartment. The method is based on energy balance in the upper gas layer in compartment
fire. Based on experimental data, Thomas selected the temperature of 577 °C as a criterion
for flashover. Equation 14 was derived, which can be used to approximate required HRR for
flashover.
7.8 378F T o oQ A A H< ∗% (14)
Where: FQ% = Heat release rate required for flashover
AT = Total surface area of compartment
Babrauskas [39] presented a similar method, where the temperature of 600 °C at the upper
gas layer was used for flashover criterion. Babrauskas noticed that the relation between HRR
required for flashover and stochiometric HRR exists. Stochiometric HRR describes the max-
imum amount of fuel that can be theoretically burned with a given air flow. Most fuels re-
lease heat for about 3000 kJ for burnt kilogram of air. As this can be taken as a constant, the
maximum HRR with given ventilation conditions can be approximated with equation 15.
1500stoich o oQ A H<% (15)
29
Where: stoichQ% = Stochiometric heat release rate [kW]
It was noticed that FQ%  varies between 0.4 stoichQ%  and 0.7 stoichaQ% . Best overall fit to original
data was obtained with 0.5 stoichQ% . From this realization equation 16 was derived.
750F o oQ A H<% (16)
McCafferey et al. [40] presented another alternative method for approximating HRR re-
quired for flashover. This method uses upper gas layer temperature of 522 °C as a flashover
criterion. Equation 17 is used to approximate the HRR required for flashover.
610F k T o oQ h A A H<% (17)
Where: hk = Effective heat transfer coefficient [kW/m2K]
Poon [41] compared the above-mentioned methods for approximating the HRR required for
flashover with different compartment and ventilation parameters. It was found that the
method of McCaffrey et al. was the most conservative, giving the smallest HRRs for flash-
over. Babrauskas’ method gave the highest predictions. Poon also compared these calcula-
tions with the results obtained from CFAST zone fire model. Thomas’ method was in best
agreement with the CFAST results. As a result, the method of Thomas was selected to be
used in the model.
4.2.5 Fully grown phase
At fully grown phase, maximum HRR will be reached. The power of the Maximum HRR
depends on available fuel, ventilation and compartment geometry. The contribution of the
compartments’ fire load to fire development can be presented in the form kW/m2, where the
amount of HRR [kW] is obtained from statistics. This is a typical way to assess the fire load
within a compartment, when more detailed information is not available. If the amount of
combustible materials and its properties are known, a theoretical maximum HRR for oxy-
gen-controlled and fuel-surface-controlled fires can be calculated more accurately for a
given application. Often fire becomes oxygen-controlled rather than fuel-surface-controlled,
for which the method presented above applies to.
The theoretic maximum oxygen controlled HRR was previously presented as stoichQ% , but in
reality, combustion is never complete. Equation 18 takes this into account with the combus-
tion efficiency factor, which is the relation between effective and complete combustion [31].
The value for combustion efficiency can be assumed to lay between 0,70 – 0,85 [42].
( ) 1500v o omaxQ A Hβ< √ √% (18)
Where: β = Combustion efficiency factor
4.2.6 Decay phase
If no automatic or manual suppressing actions are taken, the fire will start to decay when
enough fuel has been burned. Decaying of the fire starts when 70 % - 80 % of the fuel load
have been burned [20,43]. The decaying phase is exponential with a long tail. The time for
the fire to decay is solved from equation 19. The heat release rate during decay phase is
presented in equation 20. [31].
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Where: incQ% = Required heat release rate for sustained burning
td = Decay start time
tg = Growth end time
qtotal = Total fire load
φ = Percentage of consumed fire load before decay phase
Decay scaling parameter adjusts the shape and length of the HRR curve. It is scaled so that
the remaining fuel load is consumed during the decay phase.
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Where: σ = Decay scaling parameter
4.2.7 Effect of sprinklers
Sprinklers are dimensioned so that they are able to cut off growth of the HRR and turn it into
the decay phase. A traditional empirical model for sprinklers’ effects on HRR is presented
in equation 21. This traditional model turns the HRR into decay immediately when the sprin-
klers are activated. A more realistic model, which is more in line with the experiments, is
presented in equation 22. This model allows the HRR to grow, but in a slower phase, until it
starts to decay. [21]. The latter alternative was chosen to be used in the model due to more
conservative results and compliance with the experiments.
( )( ) ( ) actk t tspr actQ t Q t e, √ ,< √% % (21)
Where: sprQ% = Heat release rate when sprinklers are activated
k = Constant that depends on water mass flux
tact = Time of sprinkler activation
( )( ) ( ) actk t tsprQ t Q t e, √ ,< √% % (22)
It should be noted, that water mist systems have largely replaced sprinkler systems onboard
cruise ships. However, there are no proven formulae to model the water mist suppression
effect on HRR [21], thus sprinklers are used in the model.
Sprinklers are heat-activated, and their activation can be modelled as a heat detector. Heating
of a sensor can be described with equation 23 [21]. A time constant τ is obtained from the
equation 24 [21].
1 ( )d g ddT T T
dt σ
< , (23)
Where: Td = Sensor temperature [°C]
Tg = Hot gas and flame temperature [°C]
τ = Time constant [s]
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u
σ < (24)
Where: RTI = Response-time index of the sensor [m1/2s1/2]
u = Flow velocity of the hot gases [m/s]
Alpert [44] developed a method for assessing hot gas temperatures and flow velocities, spe-
cifically for modelling detector activation. The following correlations are used:
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Where: T∞ = Ambient temperature [°C]H = Height from fire base to ceiling [m]r = Radial distance from fire center to detector [m]
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4.2.8 Effect of the ship’s fire brigade
Here the assumption is made, that ship fire brigade reacts to the fire alarm, assembles at the
nearest fire station, and heads to the fire location. Success of fire extinguishing by ships’ fire
brigade depends on multiple parameters, of which the main three are; size of the fire, pro-
fessional ability and strength of the fire brigade and the accessibility of the fire at its location.
Now, in light of this thesis, the accessibility of the fire cannot be taken into account as a
variable,  as  the  specific  compartment  layouts  or  objects  within  the  compartments  are  not
known. Thus, only the size of the fire at the time of intervention and professional ability and
strength of the fire brigade are taken into account.
McDaniel [45] did success/failure probability distributions based on flame/heat area of the
fire for individual persons and fire departments with different strength levels. Hakkarainen
et al. [21] converted the distributions into SI units. The converted curves are presented in
Figure 4. Themelis et al. [23] utilized the same curves in their research for the FIREPROOF
project. To model a ships’ fire brigade, a 30 % decrease in the probability of success was
used in the project FIREPROOF in order to take into account the lesser training of the fire-
fighting team onboard a ship and the complexity of the enclosure.
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Figure 4. NFPA firefighting failure curves, reproduced from [21].
Themilis et al. [23] used the formulation by Heskestad [46] to calculate the flame/heat area.
The equation used is presented in equation 29. It was noted, that fires in compartments could
be treated as pool fires, which equation 29 models, with suitable L/D variations. Heskestads’
equation relates to outside pool fires and long, deep storage spaces [46]. Thus, the applica-
bility to compartment fires is questionable. In compartment fires the heat radiation from the
ceiling to the floor and to the surrounding objects accelerates the fire spread, which then
correlates to the accelerated flame/heat area spread. As no better way of determining
flame/heat area for compartment fires were found, the above-described method will be used.
2/50.02 0.235L D Q< , √ ∗ % (29)
Where: L = Height of pool fire [m]
D = Diameter of pool fire [m]
4.3 Fire spread
Fire spread requires insulation failure to occur between an initial compartment and an adja-
cent compartment. In SOLAS Chapter II-2, Reg 9 boundary insulations are specified for
every space combination onboard a ship. Each insulation class is tested using the SOLAS
standard time-temperature curve. Themelis [31] stated that insulation failure could be as-
sessed by comparing the upper layer gas temperature against the SOLAS standard curve. A
similar approach was presented by Guarin [24].
In Guarin’s method the correlation between the energy released by the fire and the temper-
ature is utilized. The T∙t product of the standard fire is compared to T∙t product of the design
fire. If A60 boundary is in question, it is assumed that the cold side ΔT is 140 °C after 60
minutes of exposure. Now T∙t product of standard time-temperature curve is taken from the
time of 60 minutes. When the upper gas layer temperature of the design fire is known as a
function of time, the time step, when T∙t product of the design fire equals to that of the
standard fires at time of 60 min can be determined. At this time, the cold side ΔT can be
assumed to be 140 °C.
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Walton and Thomas [37] presented a model for approximating the upper layer gas tempera-
ture. The model is presented in equation 30.
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∞ (30)
Where: Tg = Upper layer gas temperature [K]
4.4 Evacuation from initial space
Evacuation from initial space addresses the evacuation from the space of the fire ignition. It
is assumed, that the evacuation starts immediately, when the fire ignition is observed. Thus,
it is assumed that the fire has not spread from the space of ignition to adjacent spaces, before
the space of ignition has been evacuated. Based on these assumptions, evacuees are assumed
to be safe, when they exit the space of ignition.
A strategy for the evacuation of a single space can be described as protect-in-place or relo-
cation. In the protect-in-place strategy, adequate fire protection on site is provided to enable
the evacuees to stay even in the space of ignition or to escape to adjacent spaces. The protect-
in-place strategy is used in complex facilities, especially, when the moving of evacuees is
limited for some reason, e.g., in hospitals, surgery facilities, correctional occupancies etc.
[47].
In the relocation strategy, the evacuees are evacuated to adjacent spaces, that provide struc-
tural fire protection or enough distance to the place of ignition. This strategy is typical for
high-rise buildings, where the evacuees are evacuated to the lower floors. [47].
Today, a usual way of assessing the evacuation time of a single space is to conduct agent-
based  egress  simulations.  This  is  the  usual  way of  deriving  the  required  safe  egress  time
(RSET) for an FSA analysis. The available safe egress time (ASET) is then obtained with
fire simulations. Agent-based egress simulations require a specific software, which makes
the use of such simulations in this model too difficult.
A simpler and less accurate way of assessing the evacuation of a single space, or a larger
complex, is the use of hydraulic calculation model. Several hydraulic models exist, and due
to  simplicity,  multiple  limitations  are  present  in  all  of  them.  Hydraulic  models  generally
calculate as a function of a time, the flow of persons from a component of an evacuation
route to the next component. [48].
The method presented in [48] includes the steps explained below, here the only steps needed
for calculation of egress time of a single space, are explained. In the method, advancement
in each component in the egress route are calculated separately. The components include
doorways, corridors, stairs, etc. The method can be used to simulate evacuation of a whole
building or another complex system, but it is applicable to a single space as well.
For the calculation, the effective width of the evacuation route component is needed. The
effective width is the clear width of the egress component in question. In [48], multiple ex-
amples of effective width calculations are presented. Here it is assumed that in the evacuation
from the initial space, the doorway is the only egress component. The effective width of a
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doorway is the actual passage width of the doorway, when the door is open. Thus, the di-
mension might not be from frame to frame, if the door does not fold far enough.
The walking speed of the evacuees, S, is also needed. Based on previous research, it is ob-
served that the walking speed in an evacuation scenario depends, among physical properties
of the evacuees, on the density of the population in the space to be evacuated. The walking
speed is obtained with equation 31. The speed of an evacuation is presented in Figure 5 as a
function of density.
S k akD< , (31)
Where: D = Population density [persons/m2]
a = constant, 0,266
k = constant for doorway, 1.40
Figure 5. Evacuation speed as a function density [48].
The next step is the calculation of specific flow, Fs. Specific flow is the flow of the evacuees
after the specific evacuation component in the calculation. The specific flow is determined
as presented in equation 32.
SF SD< (32)
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Based on the specific flow, the calculated flow, Fc, is calculated. The calculated flow is the
flow of persons through specific evacuation components. The calculated flow is obtained as
presented in equation 33.
c s eF FW< (33)
Where: We = Effective width [m]
Time of passage tp of a specific evacuation component is then calculated, as presented in
equation 34. This is the evacuation time in case of single space evacuation calculation.
p
c
Pt
F
< (34)
All steps can be integrated into one formula, which is presented in equation 35.
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4.5 Ship-scale evacuation
IMO MSC.1/Circ 1533 - Revised guidelines on evacuation analysis for new and existing
passenger ships [49], outlines ship-scale evacuation. Ship-scale evacuation is divided in two
parts; evacuation to assembly stations and evacuation from assembly stations to lifeboats or
to embarkation. A minimum of four cases are required to be analyzed; primary and second-
ary  cases,  of  which  both  day  and  night  cases  are  analyzed.  The  stages  of  evacuation  are
divided in four parts; reaction (R), travel (T), embarkation (E) and launching (L). After all
individual components are calculated, the overall evacuation time is calculated using the
equation 36. As can be seen from the equation, evacuation to and from assembly station to
lifeboats is assumed to overlap with one-third of the E+L time. A safety factor of 1.25 is
required for reaction and travel time.
1.25( ) 2 / 3( )R T E L n∗ ∗ ∗ ′ (36)
Where: n = 80 min for passenger ships with more than 3 main vertical zones
(E+L) ≤ 30 min
In [49], two methods are presented for evacuation analysis; simplified and advanced. The
simplified method utilizes a basic hydraulic evacuation model, while the advanced method
allows the use of modern evacuation simulation software, where, in most cases, each agent
is treated as an individual. Even though the trend has been more towards the use of modern
simulation software, hydraulic models have their place in initial and comparative estimates
[12].
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5 Model development
In this chapter, development of the model for assessing holistic fire safety onboard a cruise
ship is explained. Firstly, it should be addressed that this model is meant to be used in the
concept phase of a cruise ship design, as well as for comparing fire safety levels of different
cruise ships. The use in concept phase sets some limitations and requirements. Limitations
arise from the quality of available data and the main requirement is that the model should be
fast and easy to use. In the concept phase changes in design occur often and quickly. If an
excessive amount of labor is needed to get results from the model, it will not be used. So,
the focus on development of this model is in the ease of use, and in some cases with the cost
of accuracy. Another point is that, as the model is meant - at least in this phase - for compar-
ative use, assessing the actual fire safety level is not of highest priority. Instead, in this phase,
it is enough that in most cases a change in the parameters changes the results in a reasonable
direction and with reasonable magnitude.
The fire risk index approach was selected to be used. The FRI method was previously pre-
sented in this paper. Below, in Figure 6, the block diagram of function of the model is pre-
sented. Two workbooks are used, PFS and Risk Model (RM). The general functioning of the
model and its parts are presented below. More detailed descriptions of the modules and the
mathematical solutions are presented later in this chapter. Now, the first role of the PFS is
explained and RM is assessed afterwards.
The PFS simulates design fires. In each simulation, an HRR curve is created. Variables, like
the floor area of the compartment and the fire growth rate, which are used for the design fire,
are randomly sampled separately for each simulation from pre-determined probability dis-
tributions. From each simulation, the floor area of the simulated space, and whether flasho-
ver occurred and/or whether boundary penetrations were experienced, are recorded. As a
result, a database is created. Fire categories are assigned based on SOLAS space categories.
Overlap in fire-related parameters led to eight fire categories, which are used for all 14 SO-
LAS space categories. A separate database is created for each fire category.
Next, the use of the RM is explained. All eight fire-category specific databases are imported
to the RM. Next, ship specific space attributes are imported from NAPA. With these param-
eters, the RM calculates everything else. The formation of the final FRI is discussed next.
As mentioned earlier, the RM consists of three modules; fire safety, evacuation and resili-
ence. Each module is explained separately below. From each module a score is obtained.
The score can vary between 0 and 1. The higher the score, the better. The final FRI is then
obtained  by  multiplying  the  scores  with  weight  values.  At  the  time of  writing  this  thesis,
each module is considered as equally important, thus the weight value of each module is 1/3.
This means that the final FRI can vary between 0 and 1.
Fire module
In the fire module, a space specific sub-fire-risk-index is calculated for every space onboard.
The index consists of probabilities of boundary penetrations and flashovers, and in some
spaces, from the time it takes to evacuate a single space under evaluation. The ignition fre-
quency of the space is calculated as presented in equation 7. The probability of flashover
and boundary penetrations are obtained as presented in section 5.4. If a SOLAS category 8
space, i.e. a public space, is in question, then also the evacuation time of the space in ques-
tion, calculated as presented in section 4.4, is taken into account in the space specific sub-
fire-risk-index. The evacuation time of the space is scored based on the time it takes to empty
the room. The individual space sub-fire-risk-index is then the sum of flashover and boundary
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penetrations probabilities and the initial space evacuation score. The combined spaces’ sub-
fire-risk-index is then obtained by summing the scores of all spaces onboard, and then by
dividing the sum with a reference value, which sets the score between 0 and 1.
Evacuation module
In the evacuation module, the ship-scale evacuation is assessed. Now, it should be men-
tioned, that the evacuation module was left unfinished, as a reliable and suitable way of
assessing embarkation was not found. Evacuation to assembly stations is calculated as pre-
sented in section 5.3.1 and ship-scale evacuation is calculated as presented in section 5.3.2.
The time results obtained from these calculations are then summed and divided by a refer-
ence time. The result is the ship-scale evacuation sub-index, which varies between 0 and 1.
Resilience module
The resilience module assesses the ships’ capability to perform its duty as the best lifeboat
after  a  large,  1  -  2  MVZ  fire.  The  items,  which  are  evaluated,  were  selected  based  on  a
questionnaire, explained in section 5.2. The weight values for the items were obtained using
the Analytical Hierarchy Process, described in section 5.2 as well. A set of measurable and
quantitative parameters were selected based on the expert judgement of Meyer Turku, to
represent each item, which was selected as a measurement criterion from the questionnaire.
In the resilience module, the ships’ features are compared to the parameters of the particular
item, and a score is obtained. Each item can obtain a score between 0 and 1. The score is
then multiplied by the weight value of the item, presented in Table 7. As a result, the maxi-
mum score from the resilience module is 1.
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Figure 6. FRI block diagram.
5.1 Input data
NAPA allows straightforward data exportation from the ship database with custom macros
to .csv format. So, it was decided, that input for the model would be exported from NAPA
to as a large extent as possible.
NAPA has an insulation manager, which automatically generates the required insulations for
bulkheads and decks, based on SOLAS’ categories. When the insulation manager is used,
the accuracy of the ship space or volume model is crucial. If modelling errors occur, incorrect
insulations can be assigned. It was decided, that the easiest way to export the required data
was to use the insulation manager with added custom macros. Information from the insula-
tion manager, i.e. the space connections and insulations, are needed further on. Additional
macros were added to the insulation manager, which extracts other needed data. This way,
one manager tool can be used for all purposes of the developed model. The exported data
will be addressed more closely below, with parts of the model, where certain data is used.
As deck numbers are not available in NAPA, a suitable formulation had to be configured
into RM. From NAPA, minimum and maximum Z coordinates of each space are obtained,
and based on these, the deck number can be determined. In the RM, the user must manually
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feed all deck heights and corresponding deck numbers. Then, based on the comparison be-
tween minimum and maximum Z coordinates and deck heights, the RM determines the deck
number.
5.2 Resilience module
The idea behind the resilience module is to include the ships’ ability to function after a large,
1 - 2 MVZ fire, into the model. In the model, the resilience module includes the attributes
and their weightings. The user of the model then needs to assign ship specific scores for each
attribute. In order to enable scoring of the attributes for a specific ship, a scoring table will
be formed. In the table, the scores are obtained by using physical measurements or other
quantitative measures. Quantitative measures are used to avoid biased and uninformed
scores by the users. As an example, the availability of electricity after a 1 - 2 MVZ fire could
be scored based on the longitudinal and vertical distance between the main engine rooms
and the emergency generator, if the cabling is fire-protected, and by the number of main
engine rooms and if the main engine rooms are located within the same MVZ.
Questionnaire
As no meaningful way to quantify this type of resilience based on the NAPA input was
available, it was decided, that the attributes and their weight values would be obtained based
on a two-part questionnaire and the utilization of AHP.
In the first part of the questionnaire, the recipients were asked to list in rank order the ten
most important items or features that should remain functional after a large 1 - 2 MVZ fire,
where  1  being  the  most  important  and  10  being  the  least  important.  The  answer  sheet  is
presented in Appendix 1. The answers from the first part were analyzed and the 7 most often
answered and highly ranked items or features were selected as attributes for the resilience
module. As no answer alternatives were provided in the questionnaire, the same items and
features were mentioned in a slightly different manner multiple times. Thus, in the analyzing
process, based on the answers and explanations, the same answers that were written in a
slightly different manner were combined. The selected attributes are presented in rank order
in Table 6. All of the selected attributes were answered by at least by 50 % of the question-
naire attendees. Ranking of the attributes was performed by reversing the rank order numbers
assigned by the questionnaire attendees and by summing the points obtained by each answer.
Thus, the attribute that was seen as most important by the questionnaire attendees gained 10
points and the least important gained 1 point.
Table 6. Selected attributes for resilience module.
1 Emergency Power
2 External Communications
3 Fire Fighting Systems
4 Internal Communications
5 Availability of LSA
6 Crew Emergency education/Skills
7 Fire main availability/capacity
In the second part of the questionnaire, the recipients were asked to compare the selected
attributes against each other and to assign importance values for one over the other by using
the scale in Table 1. A template was formed, which included all 21 comparisons, which was
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sent to the same professionals that answered in the first part. The template is presented in
Appendix 2.
The results of the second part of the questionnaire were analyzed using an Excel template
[50]. Nine professionals answered the second part of the questionnaire. Consensus of the
pairwise comparisons between the participants was 66,8 %, which is scaled as “moderate”
by the template. The mean relative error of the final eigenvector is 25,9 %. Given the com-
plexity of the comparisons, the result can be thought to be reasonable. Differences in the
pairwise comparisons highlight the need for multiple participants in a questionnaire like this.
The  final  weight  values  of  the  attributes  are  presented  in  Table  7.  Interestingly,  the  final
weight values were not in line with the results of the first part of the questionnaire. In the
first part of the questionnaire the participants had to come up with the items and features
without any proposed alternatives. In the second part comparisons between the selected al-
ternatives were provided. This most likely led to more thoroughly thought answers and com-
parisons. Also, the items or features that an individual participant did not answer in the first
round were presented in the comparisons of the second round. Based on the valuations it was
clear, that many participants valued items and features highly, even though they did not come
up with that specific item/feature in their own first round answer. This induces differences
in the final preferences.
Table 7. Attribute weight values.
1 Emergency Power 0,179
2 External Communications 0,072
3 Fire Fighting Systems 0,224
4 Internal Communications 0,257
5 Availability of LSA 0,100
6 Crew Emergency Education/Skills 0,052
7 Fire Main Availability/Capacity 0,115
Consistency of the pairwise comparisons by an individual participant describes how logi-
cally the individual has valued different comparisons. A limiting value of 10 % was proposed
by Saaty [18] to deem the comparison as successful. Elsewhere, in the context of multiple
participants in the same AHP evaluation, the limiting factor of 10 % is criticized to be unre-
alistic [50].
Consistency ratios (CR) of matrixes produced by individual participants varied between 5 -
56 %, the average CR was 19,4 %. Only two matrixes resulted in a lower than 10 % CR.
Thus, another refinement round should be performed for the rest of the matrixes by the par-
ticipants.
Ship evaluation against selected attributes
A quantitative way of evaluating the ship regarding the selected attributes, which are pre-
sented in Table 6, was developed. A set of multiple parameters of ship features were selected
to represent each attribute shown in Table 6. A group of professionals from different design
departments at Meyer Turku developed the sets of parameters, to ensure as reliable and re-
alistic assessments, as possible. Depending on the nature of the parameters, simple “yes” or
“no” answers are used to evaluate the performance of the ship regarding the parameter, or a
linear scale is used. If a linear scale is used, minimum and maximum values are selected
based  on  statistics  of  the  feature  in  question.  A  weight  value  was  also  assigned  for  each
parameter so that a score regarding for one attribute from Table 6 can vary between 0 and 1.
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This score is then multiplied with the weight value of the attribute  in question. As a result,
the score from the resilience module can vary between 0 and 1.
5.3 Evacuation module
The evacuation module is divided in two sections; evacuation from initial space and ship-
scale evacuation. Evacuation from initial space is meant to assign each space in the ship an
evacuation performance sub-index, which is then used together with the results from the fire
module, in order to derive a space-specific FRI.
Ship-scale evacuation forms the evacuation sub-index of the ship. In ship-scale evacuation,
day- and night-time cases will be taken into account. Due to time constraints, development
of the ship-scale evacuation module was excluded from the scope of this thesis. A ship-scale
evacuation module will be developed in the future. Some initial considerations about ship-
scale evacuation were addressed and are explained below.
5.3.1 Evacuation from initial space
The evacuation time from a cabin or from another similar small space, depends mainly on
the reaction time of the individuals in the space. The length of the evacuation route and the
door sizes are irrelevant in these cases. Human life can be assumed to be endangered in a
fire in the above-described small spaces in the following situations; the persons in the spaces
are sleeping, sprinklers do not activate and the fire is able to develop freely, or smoldering
combustion produces enough toxic gases to cause a threat for health. As evacuation in these
cases is not the criteria to determine whether the persons survive, such spaces are not taken
into account in evacuation-from-initial-spaces part of the module.
Among the most relevant spaces to be considered in this section are large public spaces, from
where a big number of people must be evacuated in case of fire.
Due to the above-mentioned reasons, in the model, the evacuation time in the initial space is
taken into account only in calculation of space-specific FRI sub-indexes of public spaces.
The hydraulic model, which was presented previously, is utilized. The needed effective
width of the doorway and population density is obtained from the FSS code [6]. In the FSS
code, the number of persons P in public spaces is calculated as shown in equation 37. The
effective width of the doorway is 900 mm at minimum, if more than 90 persons can be
assumed to facilitate the space, then the effective width is calculated using equation 38.
0.75
2
AP < √ (37)
0.9 ( 90) 0.01eW P< ∗ , √ (38)
As the density of persons stays constant, also the specific flow stays constant. This results in
a situation, where the maximum evacuation time is 211.6 seconds using the hydraulic model.
This time is achieved with a floor area of 240 m2. When the floor area decreases from this,
the evacuation time gradually closes to zero. If a larger floor area is calculated, the evacua-
tion time will always stay constant. This is not the most realistic scenario, but it is quite well
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in line with a confidential study that Meyer Turku commissioned VTT to perform [51]. Ac-
cording to the study, in most fire cases, large public spaces were evacuated in approximately
three minutes.
5.3.2 Ship-scale evacuation
Here it should be noted, that the rules for evacuation always guide the design of the ship.
When the stairs, evacuation routes and doorways are dimensioned according to the require-
ments, ship-scale evacuation performance is, based on the experience of Meyer Turku,
within acceptable time required by the prescriptive rules. If the first evacuation simulations
are not successful, the most critical items or locations are studied and the required changes
into the design are implemented to reach the required evacuation time. Due to the above-
mentioned matters, ship-scale evacuation performance is assumed to vary between different
ships within a normal scale of ship evacuation times.
Developing a reliable and justified way of assessing embarkation from the assembly stations
to the lifeboats and MES, turned out to be rather time-consuming. Due to the above-men-
tioned reason and to the already large scope of the thesis, developing an embarkation model
was left to be done in future work.
A method for assessing the first part of the evacuation; passenger movement to assembly
stations, is presented below.
Evacuation to assembly stations
The approach presented here is based on the expert opinion and experience of Meyer Turku
and Tim Meyer-König from Traffgo-HT, who have been involved in the development of
IMO evacuation analysis guidelines.
In typical evacuation simulations, a large number of simulations are run. Due to probabilistic
pedestrian characteristics that are used in the simulations, the simulation results vary. From
all of the simulations, the 95-percentile result is used as a final result. This means the value,
of which 95 % of the simulations were faster, and of which 5 % were slower.
Based on Meyer Turku’s and Traffgo-HT’s experience, it has been observed, that when
enough evacuation simulations are conducted, the longest evacuation times arise from situ-
ations, where the person with the slowest possible reaction time and walking speed, accord-
ing to the IMO criterion, is situated in the most distant location from the assembly station.
The longest times usually represent the 95-percentile result quite well. Based on this reali-
zation, an Excel spreadsheet in RM was created, which, in a day case, automatically recog-
nizes the most distant space within the same MVZ from the assembly station and calculates
XYZ distances from that space to the assembly station. In a night case the procedure is the
same, except the most distant cabin is used for the XYZ distance calculations. Within the
spreadsheet these distances are then multiplied with the walking speed in the form of m/s.
Walking speeds are obtained from MSC1533 [49]. As a result, durations for each movement
are obtained and these are then summed, and the reaction times are added. The result is the
evacuation time. This method does not produce a fully realistic evacuation time, which could
be thought of as an equivalent observation to the actual evacuation simulation result. How-
ever, the method provides a simple and comparable way of assessing evacuation to assembly
station.
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5.4 Fire module
The fire module consists of two parts; the first part is in the model itself and the second part
comes from a specific PFS workbook. Ignition frequencies are calculated in the model and
the events after fire ignition are obtained from the PFS input. In practice, a database of fire
scenarios  is  created  with  PFS  for  each  fire  category.  From  the  simulations  that  form  the
database, thee floor area and whether flashover and/or boundary penetrations occurred, are
recorded. These databases are then imported into the model. Based on the floor area, the
SOLAS category and adjacent spaces, the probability of flashover and fire spread to an ad-
jacent space, is obtained from the database. The probability of flashover for a single space
is obtained by finding spaces with similar floor areas as the space under the evaluation, from
the correct database, and dividing the number of found areas by the number of occurrences
of flashovers in the found spaces. The same principle is used for probabilities of boundary
penetrations.
Probabilities derived from the database do not include contribution of ignition frequency.
Thus, space-specific probability of flashover is obtained with the equation 39 and the prob-
ability of fire spread to adjacent spaces with the equation 40. These probabilities are then
used to derive the space-specific fire safety sub-index.
( ) ( )i i diP F P Fφ< √ (39)
Where: P(Fi) = Probability of flashover in space i
iφ  = Probability of ignition of space i
P(Fdi) = Probability of flashover in space i, derived from database
( ) ( )i i diP S P Sφ< √ (40)
Where: P(Si) = Probability of fire spread from space i
P(Sdi) = Probability of fire spread from space I, derived from database
As calculation of fire scenarios requires deep understanding of the phenomena and calcula-
tion process, the division in two parts enables simple and easy use of the model. On the other
hand, the division also enables more a complex and accurate fire scenario generation. Im-
plementing all the required formulae and processes into same model, where information
from thousands of spaces is imported, proved to be quite challenging. Basically, the idea is
that almost anyone can use the model itself if no changes in the fire scenarios are needed.
This is the case, e.g., when the layout of the ship is changed, or new spaces are added. If
changes to the fire scenarios are needed, then a more fire-inclined person will modify and
run the new PFS workbooks.
5.4.1 Fuel load
Fire load density and fire load can be calculated accurately for a given space, when the com-
bustibles within the space are well known. As the model developed in this thesis does not
possess such information, simplifications are required.
Like mentioned before, the SOLAS limits the amount of combustible materials used onboard
a ship and based on SOLAS’ space categories. Thus, the mass per unit area of combustible
materials is based on the SOLAS category. The amounts of combustible materials in each
SOLAS space category is presented in Table 8.
44
Table 8. Amounts of combustible materials.
SOLAS
category Definition
Amount of combus-
tible material
[kg/m2]
1 Control station 15
2 Stairway 5
3 Corridors 5
4 Evacuation station and external escape routes 15
5 Open deck spaces 10
6 Accommodation spaces for minor fire risk 15
7 Accommodation spaces for moderate fire risk 35
8 Accommodation spaces for greater fire risk 35
9 Sanitary, and similar spaces 10
10 Tanks, voids and auxiliary machinery spaces having little orno fire risk 5
11 Auxiliary machinery spaces, cargo spaces, cargo and otheroil tanks and other similar spaces of moderate fire risk 35
12 Machinery spaces and main galleys 45
13 Storerooms, workshops, pantries, etc. 20
14 Other spaces in which flammable liquids are stowed 45
5.4.2 Ignition frequencies
Previous research on ignition frequencies onboard cruise ships were discussed before in sec-
tion 4.1. Due to the large database used in the project FIREPROOF, SOLAS category spe-
cific ignition frequencies obtained by Themelis and Nikos [23] were chosen to be used in
the model. As ignition frequencies are already expressed as s-y/m2, the ignition frequency
for each space is obtained easily by multiplying the floor area of the space with the SOLAS
category specific ignition frequency. Besides the floor area and SOLAS category, deck and
MVZ - where the space is located - is imported to the model from NAPA.
Ignition frequencies of each space are used later in forming space specific sub-attribute for
overall fire safety index. For illustrative and comparisonal purposes, ignition frequencies of
each space within same the deck and MVZ are summed and presented in illustrative table
with color coding, based on ignition frequency. Example of generated table is presented
below Figure 7. Table provides an easy way to observe the ignition frequency distribution
and to identify areas with most frequent fire ignitions. It should be noted that in Figure 7,
ship is facing left instead of normal direction, right.
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MVZ
1 2 3 4 5
De
ck
13 0.000377 0.000726
12 0.004883 0.004109 0.005096 0.004804
11 0.086408 0.160079 0.165154 0.207922
10 0.102026 0.07361 0.221112 0.133099
9 0.126272 0.092905 0.064829 0.07192
8 0.000309 0.084415 0.104356 0.081193 0.072017
7 0.084345 0.038108 0.053648 0.070892
6 0.082659 0.044877 0.070179 0.071908
5 4.67E-05 0.031513 0.040022 0.108143 0.064411
4 0.008799 0.001506 0.004481 0.001641 0.003681
3 0.009772 0.006239 0.002578 0.016542 0.003561
2 0.008132 0.126518 0.350956 0.127466 0.068281
1 0.003595 0.666127 0.024415 0.001346
Figure 7. Ignition frequencies per deck/MVZ.
5.4.3 Fire scenarios
As mentioned, the fire scenarios are calculated with PFS. The equations presented in section
4 are used. The constructed PFS model calculates each fire scenario independently. From
each simulation, the floor area, whether flashover occurred or not and whether a failure of
15, 30 or 60 minutes rated boundaries were achieved, are recorded. All the aspects presented
in section 4 are implemented into the model. Based on variable parameters, each simulation
calculates the HRR development with s 20 second time step from 0 to 240 minutes. Variable
parameters and their distribution types are presented in Table 9.
Table 9. Variable parameters.
Response-time index, RTI Uniform
Fire growth rate, α Triangular
Floor area, a Uniform
Fire brigade response time, tresp Custom
X-distance from fire to detector, x Uniform
Y-distance from fire to detector, y Uniform
Sprinkler activation probability, SAP Uniform
Fire brigade success probability, FBSP Uniform
When no more detailed analysis for the fire growth rate in every application is performed,
the single or variable fire growth rate is usually used. For the variable fire growth rate, uni-
form, normal and triangular distributions are the most common, depending on the applica-
tion. When assigning fire growth rates for SOLAS categories in the model, based on the
descriptions of fire growth categories, the most applicable and one higher were selected. One
higher was opted to emphasis the worst-case scenario. When assigning the distribution type,
it was rationalized, that normal distribution would give too much emphasis on the high end
of values, and normal distribution would give too much variation in sampling due to thin
ends of the spectrum. Thus, triangular distribution was selected.
The fire brigade response time (tresp) is a custom probability distribution. The distribution
describes the time between the fire alarm and the time, when the fire brigade reaches the fire
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site. Thus, the time includes reaction time, travel to the fire station of the same MVZ, prep-
aration and travel to fire site. The distribution is constructed based on the experience and
operational practices of a ship operator; Royal Caribbean Cruise Line [52].
As a single simulation is meant to produce an actual HRR curve and not just probabilities of
events, a slightly more complex approach is required for the parameters, which are expressed
as probabilities.
Whether the sprinklers activate or not depends on sprinkler reliability level (SRL). As this can
change based on the sprinklers used, an easily changeable reliability level was implemented
into the model. In the model, the user sets the sprinkler reliability in the form of 0 - 1, usually
around 0.96. The variable parameter, sprinkler activation probability (SAP), ranges uniformly
between 0 and 1. In the model, sprinklers are activated if SAP < SRL.
 A similar approach was implemented for the probability that the ships’ fire brigade is suc-
cessful in suppression of the fire. All four fire-area-dependent probability distributions,
which were presented in section 4, are implemented to the model. The user needs to select,
with which fire brigade proficiency level the ship is equipped with. Then, based on the size
of the fire at time of fire brigade intervention, suppression is determined to be either suc-
cessful or unsuccessful. Again, if the variable parameter fire brigade success probability
(FBSP) is greater than the fire area-dependent failure probability obtained from the distribu-
tion, the fire brigade is successful.
5.4.3.1 Assumptions in the model
As probability of flashover and boundary failures are selected as the criteria for fire risk sub-
index for an individual compartment, determination of these is the main task of the PFS
model. In theory, it would be possible to mathematically model a fire model which takes into
account all of the affecting factors and their probabilities. This would, however, result in an
unnecessarily complex model, that would be almost impossible to modify in the future. Also,
available data for some factors is not relevant nor accurate enough to justify direct use in the
fire model. To encounter this problem, some assumptions are implemented in the model.
The mathematical model of the sprinkler always leads to fire decay, if the sprinkler is acti-
vated. This might not be true in all possible cases but based on literature and the comparative
nature of the model, this assumption is accepted.
In the model, if no suppressing actions are taken, fire will always reach flashover if ventila-
tion, fire growth rate, and fuel load within the compartment enable it. The sprinklers’ effect
on fire development is implemented in the model, as presented earlier in this paper. There is
a possible scenario, where the sprinkler activates right before flashover, and as HRR growth
is not cut into decay immediately when the sprinklers are activated, flashover could still be
reached. This scenario is seen as unrealistic. In reality, the sprinklers’ cooling effect would
most probably cool the surfaces of the compartment enough to prevent full flashover. Thus,
in the model it is assumed, that if the sprinkler is activated before flashover, flashover cannot
occur.
Generally, the sprinklers should be activated before the ships’ fire brigade arrives to the fire
site. However, if the sprinklers do not activate and no manual suppression by on site person-
nel is attempted, the first suppression attempt is assumed to be performed by the ships’ fire
brigade. The probability of success of suppression by the ships’ fire brigade was dealt with
earlier in this thesis. In each simulation case, based on the fire size at the time of arrival and
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proficiency of the fire brigade and based on probability, the success of suppression is deter-
mined. If suppression is determined to be successful, it is assumed, that if the fire brigade
reaches the fire site before flashover, it can control the fire and cool the compartment sur-
faces sufficiently enough so that flashover is prevented.
Fire spread from the compartment where fire has ignited to an adjacent compartment, is
assessed only through intact and insulated boundaries. Fire spread through ventilation chan-
nels etc. is not considered. It is also assumed that doors are closed. It is recognized that in
reality, fire is most likely to spread though doors, which are left open. Another probable
spread route is faulty openings and penetrations in boundaries [53].
Fire spreads through boundaries to adjacent spaces, if insulation fails and the temperature on
the cold side of the boundary is high enough to ignite an item in the adjacent compartment.
In the model, the hot upper layer gas temperature is used to predict fire spread into adjacent
compartments. In reality, the fire location plays an important role when the heating of the
boundary is assessed in an early phase of the fire. If the fire is located away from the bound-
aries, until flashover or major fire spread, relevant heating of the boundaries is done mostly
by the hot upper layer gases and some radiation, depending on the distance to the boundary.
At the beginning of the fire, hot upper layer gases cool quite rapidly when the distance to the
fire source lengthens. After the fire has ignited and developed into a flaming phase, local
heating is more rapid, if the fire is located near the boundary, due to instant heating caused
by more intense radiation. The mathematical model that is used for predicting hot upper
layer gas temperature assumes that the fire is located at the center of the compartment. The
model gives only one temperature for the hot upper layer gases. This temperature is assumed
to be an average hot upper layer gas temperature. In the model, fire location is not varied in
any  way.  If  more  detailed  and  realistic  risk  figures  were  to  be  sought  after,  fire  location
should be a variable in the model. However, as the model is of comparative nature, the cur-
rent method is justified and produces comparable results.
In the PFS model, it is also assumed, that if the ships’ fire brigade reaches the fire site before
fire spread into adjacent spaces, and if suppression is determined to be successful, the fire
will not spread even if flashover has occurred or will occur. This assumption is based on
boundary cooling and moving ignitable items in the adjacent compartments further from the
boundary between the fire compartment and the adjacent compartment. This assumption
might not be true for all possible scenarios, but based on Meyer Turku’s expert opinion, this
is a justifiable assumption and a most probable outcome.
5.4.3.2 Effective heat transfer coefficient
The effective heat transfer coefficient describes heat absorption into the boundaries of the
fire enclosure. Methods for calculating hk are designed for the general building industry. The
general procedure for the calculation of hk value assumes that the value is time dependent.
The value is time- and temperature-dependent. General procedure for value calculation pro-
duces reasonable results when wall materials are concrete, for example. When the procedure
was used for insulated steel boundaries, the results were unrealistic.
As hk value is needed for hot upper layer temperature calculation, a calibration method was
derived. Detailed fire simulations of typical compartment fire within insulated steel bound-
aries were performed with a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) software; Fire Dynamics
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Simulator (FDS). From the simulations, temperatures and the HRR were recorded as a func-
tion of time.
Value of hk was then calibrated to produce the same temperatures in similar fire and com-
partment dimensions as with equation 17. The value of hk varied between 0.32 and 0.01. To
achieve more realistic results, this procedure should be done for different sizes of compart-
ments with different types of fires. Due to time constraints this will be done in the future.
The model is still considered usable due to its comparative nature.
5.4.3.3 Number of simulations in PFS
The number of simulations in PFS needs to be optimized in order to shorten the computa-
tional  time required  for  FRI  calculation.  The  use  of  LHS versus  traditional  Monte  Carlo,
decreases the amount of required simulations due to a more even sampling. However, due
to multiple random parameters in the model, a considerable amount of simulations for each
compartment size is required to achieve consistent probabilities for flashover and boundary
failures. With a big enough number of simulations, the model will always produce the same
probabilities. If the number of simulations is too small, the calculated probabilities start to
vary.
Parameters that depend on SOLAS category are the fire load and the fire growth rate. Some
SOLAS categories were estimated to have the same fire load and fire growth rate. This led
to eight different PFS workbooks, which must be calculated separately. Fire growth rate
within the same SOLAS category spaces is assumed to vary between two consecutive values
between  SLOW,  MEDIUM,  FAST  and  ULTRA  FAST.  The  numerical  values  were  dis-
cussed earlier in this thesis. Floor areas of compartments in cruise ships vary roughly be-
tween 1 - 3000 m2. The floor areas of a single SOLAS category typically varies with smaller
distribution, thus the simulation of whole 3000 m2 spectrum is not needed for most SOLAS
categories, when the database is constructed.
Besides  variations  within  the  SOLAS  categories,  the  firefighting  proficiency  level  of  the
ship crew ended up being a major consideration when determining the required number of
simulations. This the result from a situation, where a weaker fire department cannot suppress
a fire, which a stronger fire department might be able to suppress. Thus, if a weaker depart-
ment is considered, failure is obvious and small number of simulations is enough to deter-
mine the probability. With a stronger department, a big number of simulations is required,
as the suppression is successful occasionally.
The required number of simulations for each SOLAS category with a specific firefighting
proficiency level was determined by selecting a few typical compartment sizes with even
distribution from floor area distribution of a given SOLAS category. For each compartment
size, initially 20 000 simulations were calculated, and probabilities were recorded. Then, the
number of simulations were periodically decreased until variation started to arise and were
then compared to the initial probabilities from 20 000 simulations. The selected number of
simulations was the number that produce the same probabilities as the initial simulations
with a 95 % confidence level.
As the required number of simulations varied within the same SOLAS category, based on
compartment size, the largest required number of simulations was initially selected for each
SOLAS category. The number of required simulations ended up being too high to enable
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simulation  of  one  SOLAS  category  with  one  PFS  spreadsheet,  as  the  Excel  row  number
ended up being the limiting factor. Originally, the required number of simulations was in-
vestigated with 1 m2 variation in floor area. Further analysis was performed to decrease the
number of simulations. It was observed, that similar probabilities for a given compartment
size were obtained when simulations with a ± 2.5 m2 variation in the floor area were taken
into account. As a result, the required number of simulations was decreased by 75 % from
the initial number. However, the number of rows still ended up being an issue with the better
performing firefighting levels. To combat this issue, careful investigation was performed,
and  distribution  of  floor  area  was  changed  from uniform to  custom,  where  the  areas  that
needed more simulations than others, were weighted. As a result, the number of simulations
was decreased substantially, while maintaining an acceptable 95 % confidence level.
It was noticed, that the fire growth rate is the largest SOLAS category specific attribute af-
fecting the required number of simulations. Differences in growth rate between FAST and
ULTRA FAST is the largest, when consecutive fire growth rates are compared. This resulted
in a need for the biggest number of simulations with SOLAS categories, where the fire
growth rate varies between FAST and ULTRA FAST.
The need for the biggest number of simulations is in cases, where the fire growth rate varies
between FAST and ULTRA FAST, and the ship is equipped with the most proficient fire-
fighting team. The level of the firefighting proficiency onboard was observed to be the single
most affecting factor affecting the required number of simulations. As flashovers and fire
spreads are rarer, when a more proficient firefighting team is present, more simulations are
required to attain consistent probabilities.
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6 Case study
The main purpose of the case study is to verify that the model works in an actual application.
Another object is to conduct a rough sensitivity study to ensure that parameter changes affect
the results in a correct and predictable way. A modern cruise ferry, hereafter to be called the
model ship, was selected for the case study. Main dimensions and general information of the
model ship is presented in Table 10. Car decks of the model ship had to be excluded from
the study, as the mathematical models in the model are not suitable for as large open spaces
as car decks. It should be also noted, that the evacuation module was not used in this case
study due to the unfinished ship-scale evacuation part of the module. Evacuation from the
initial space was enabled as part of the individual space FRI.
Table 10. Model ship parameters.
Length 218 m
Beam 31,8 m
Passenger capacity 2800
Crew capacity 200
Nr. Deck 13
Nr. MVZ 6
The study was initiated by extracting the ship data from NAPA to RM. At this point, some
minor adjustments, like deleting car decks, had to be done. Based on the imported attributes,
the RM successfully calculated all steps, to which information outside NAPA data is not
needed.
The next phase was collecting the needed information to run PFS simulations. All together
8 workbooks had to be created. Variables between the workbooks were the fire growth rate
and the amount of combustible materials. For the case study, the fire brigade proficiency
level “Average Department” was chosen. The categories and their variables can be seen in
Table 11. The summarized number of simulations, from where the database was created,
ended up being 3 557 000, which means that an equal number of rows had to be imported
into RM.
Table 11. Fire categories.
Fire category HRR Growth RATE Fire load [kg/m2]
1 MEDIUM - FAST 5
2 MEDIUM - FAST 10
3 MEDIUM - FAST 15
4 MEDIUM - FAST 35
5 FAST - ULTRAFAST 15
6 FAST - ULTRAFAST 35
7 FAST - ULTRAFAST 20
8 FAST - ULTRAFAST 45
After importing the database from PFS simulations, it became clear, that some functions in
the RM were too calculation intensive, and the RM slowed down considerably, and the cal-
culation updates took several minutes. This problem in managing the RM was resolved by
disabling some calculation sheets. This way the RM can be modified. When the final result
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is sought after, all calculation sheets are enabled, and the time-consuming calculation is done
only once.
Once the probabilities of flashovers and boundary penetrations were calculated for all of the
compartments of the ship, the probabilities were analyzed in groups. The groups were as-
signed according to fire categories, which were developed for PFS simulations. Some simi-
larities among the results were noticed. Flashovers were not experienced in compartments
smaller than 25 m2, also flashovers were not experienced in compartments with greater than
a 100 m2 floor area. Flashover probabilities as a function of floor area of the compartment
can be seen in Figure 8.
Figure 8. Model ship flashover probability.
In smaller compartments, boundary penetrations started to occur with the same floor areas,
as flashovers. However, boundary penetrations occurred also in the largest simulated com-
partments, except in category 1, where the amount of combustible materials within the com-
partment was the lowest. Probabilities of boundary penetrations can be seen in Figures 9-11.
It should be noted, that all compartments of the model ship do not all have the grade 60, 30
and 15 boundaries. This leads to zero results and in occasional lower values in the graphs.
Thus, figures 9-11 generally present the ballpark of probabilities as a function of floor area,
rather than exact probabilities.
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Figure 9. Model ship boundary penetration probability, 60 min.
It can be seen from figures 8-11 that category 8 fires lead to flashover and boundary pene-
tration most probably. Category 8 fires have the highest possible fire growth rate and the
highest amount of combustible materials inside the compartment. These parameters cause
the most severe fires. In both figures 9 and 10, category 8 boundary penetrations have equal
probabilities. In other categories, a small difference between grades 60 min and 30 min
boundaries can be noticed. As can be expected, grade 30 min boundaries are penetrated more
often, although the difference is not big.
Figure 10. Model ship boundary penetration probability, 30 min.
Probabilities of boundary penetrations between grades 30 min and 15 min boundaries do not
vary a lot. The lack of higher boundary penetration probabilities in figure 11, especially in
category 8 fires, originate from the lack of grade 15 min boundaries in the largest compart-
ments. Differences between probabilities of boundary penetrations between the boundaries
in consideration were surprisingly small. As mentioned before, if sprinklers are activated
before flashover or boundary penetration, such will not even occur in PFS simulations. If the
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sprinklers are not activated, actions of the ships’ fire brigade determine the fire development.
In the cases where flashover occurred, the ships’ fire brigade reached the fire site too late or
suppression was determined as unsuccessful in the simulations. As for boundary penetra-
tions, the time to reach boundary penetration is longer than the longest fire brigade response
time. This means that in cases, where boundaries were penetrated, suppression was deter-
mined to be unsuccessful. In most cases, there is enough combustible materials in the com-
partments to enable boundary penetration of grade 60 boundaries, if the fire can develop
freely. The abovementioned reasons lead to a situation, where the differences between prob-
abilities of boundary penetration between differently graded boundaries are minor.
Figure 11. Model ship boundary penetration probability, 15 min.
The following phase was to collect the ship specific attributes needed for the resilience mod-
ule. Once all of the attributes were collected and fed into the RM, the disabled calculation
sheets were enabled again, and FRI of the model ship was ready. Obtained sub-indexes and
overall FRI are presented in Table 12. In the overall FRI it should be noted, that due to the
exclusion of the evacuation module, the importance weight of 0.5 was given for both fire
and resilience module.
Table 12. Case study results.
Module Sub-Index
Fire 0,081144
Resilience 0,214989
FRI 0,296134
The chosen model ship is rather small in volume and in number of spaces onboard, if com-
pared to a large modern cruise ship. This leads to a situation, where the impact of the sub-
index from the fire module is quite small, as the additive weight method is used, and the
model is prepared to be used with large cruise ships.
It can be concluded, that the model works as intended, and no surprises were encountered,
except the longer than expected calculation times.
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FRI
In  this  case  study,  an  FRI  score  of  0,296  was  obtained.  By itself  the  FRI  score  does  not
represent anything or mean anything. The performance of the ships’ FRI score can be eval-
uated when it is compared against the FRI scores of other similar ships. The same principle
applies to sub-indexes. As the real value of the model developed in this thesis is obtained,
when multiple ships are analyzed, or when the design of one ship is analyzed.
6.1 Model sensitivity
In this chapter, the model sensitivity to different parameters is studied and results are dis-
cussed. Holistic sensitivity analysis, which covers all relations between the parameters, their
plausible value ranges and effects on the results, does not fit into the scope of this thesis.
The scope of the sensitivity study is to verify the effects of parameter changes to the results.
In the sensitivity analysis, only the effects of parameters, which are intended to be modifiable
according to the ships’ properties, are analyzed.
The model ship was used for the sensitivity study as well. The amount and diversity regard-
ing the floor area of SOLAS category 8 spaces was not enough to ensure a reliable sensitivity
study. To increase the accuracy of the sensitivity study, the sample size had to be increased.
In order to increase the sample size, all the spaces of the model ship were changed to be of
SOLAS category 8, thus being included in fire category 6.
A specific sensitivity RM was created, where all spaces were categorized as SOLAS cate-
gory 8 spaces. From this, probabilities of flashover and boundary penetrations were rec-
orded. These results were used as a baseline for the sensitivity study.
The general approach was to run multiple simulation sets in PFS, where one parameter was
varied. Then, results from each simulation set were imported into the sensitivity RM.
Changes in probability of each measured parameter was then observed.
6.1.1 Fire growth rate
The effect  of the fire growth rate was investigated by doing multiple simulation sets with
different fire growth rates and analyzing the effect on the probability of flashover and bound-
ary penetrations. Unlike in the actual model, in each simulation set, the fire growth rate was
kept constant in PFS to ensure as definitive results, as possible. The following simulated fire
growth rates were those used in the model; MEDIUM, FAST and ULTRA FAST.
Changes in ship-scale probability of flashover and boundary penetrations are presented in
Figure 12. The results are in line with the expectations. Probability of boundary penetrations
increases with the fire growth rate. In a normal fire category 6 simulation and thus in the
baseline results, the fire growth rate is varied triangularly between FAST and ULTRA FAST.
Thus,  a  slight  rise  in  the  boundary  penetration  probabilities  with  the  ULTRA  FAST  fire
growth rate was expected, as well as negative results with other fire growth rate values.
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Figure 12. Fire growth rate, sum of probability change.
In Figure 13, the average percentual change of probability of flashover and boundary pene-
trations for individual spaces is presented. The results are as predicted. As the MEDIUM fire
growth rate is not included in a regular fire category 6 fire, a larger variation of probabilities
is observed with MEDIUM fire growth rate.
Figure 13. Fire growth rate, average percentual probability change of individual spaces.
6.1.2 Fuel load density
Fuel load density was assessed with the same principles as used above with the fire growth
rate. Category 6 fires were used and other parameters than the fuel load density were kept
constant. Fuel load densities of 15 kg/m2, 25 kg/m2, 35 kg/m2 and 45 kg/m2 were investi-
gated.
Ship-scale probability change of the assessed variables is presented in Figure 14. Fuel load
density, sum of probability/index change. The results are not in line with the assumptions.
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The original assumption was that the probabilities of boundary penetrations would increase
with the fuel load density. A notable difference in probability was observed only with insu-
lation category 60 boundary penetrations with 15 kg/m2 and 25 kg/m2 fuel load densities.
And against the assumption, other probabilities than boundary penetration of insulation cat-
egory 60, decreased with the highest fuel load density, 45 kg/m2.
Figure 14. Fuel load density, sum of probability/index change.
In Figure 15, fuel load density, the average percentual probability change of individual
spaces is presented. If compared to ship-scale probability change, a slight difference is ob-
served with insulation category 30 boundary penetrations with a fuel load density of 15
kg/m2. However, the change vanishes in ship-scale.
Figure 15. Fuel load density, average percentual probability change of individual spaces.
More in-depth sensitivity analysis is required for the effect of fuel load density. If more
detailed sensitivity analysis leads to similar results, a root cause analysis must be performed
to determine the reason for the unexpected behavior of the probabilities.
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6.1.3 Sprinkler reliability
Sensitivity of the model regarding sprinkler reliability was evaluated in the same manner as
fire growth rate and fuel load density. Fire category 6 was used and other parameters were
kept constant. Sprinkler reliabilities of 92 %, 94 %, 96 %, 98 % and 100 % were analyzed.
Ship-scale probability changes are presented in Figure 16. Sprinkler reliability, sum of prob-
ability/index change. The results are reasonable and in line with the expectations. In practice,
a linear correlation in probability change is observed in the results.
Figure 16. Sprinkler reliability, sum of probability/index change.
In Figure 17, Sprinkler reliability, the average percentual probability change of individual
spaces is presented. Here slight differences between the measured variables can be observed.
Most notable is the change in probability of flashover, which forms a slight S-curve in the
figure, if compared to other variables, which are varying more linearly.
Figure 17. Sprinkler reliability, average percentual probability change of individual spaces.
-0,06
-0,04
-0,02
0
0,02
0,04
0,06
92 94 96 98 10
0
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
ch
an
ge
Sprinkler function probability
Flashover
Fail 60
Fail 30
Fail 15
-0,06
-0,04
-0,02
0
0,02
0,04
0,06
92 94 96 98 10
0
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
Ch
an
ge
Sprinkler function probability
Flashover
Fail 60
Fail 30
Fail 15
58
6.1.4 Fire department proficiency
The sensitivity of the model’s results to the fire department proficiency level was investi-
gated by conducting a full FRI analysis for the model ship with two different fire department
proficiency levels. The levels used were Average department and Average person with fire
extinguisher. All other parameters were kept constant between the analyses.
Changes in probability of flashover and boundary penetrations are presented in Table 13.
The table presents the change from the results with Average department to results with Av-
erage person with fire extinguisher. As expected, the increase in the probabilities is signifi-
cant. Change in probabilities of spaces, where flashover or boundary penetration was plau-
sible with Average department, are not as significant as Table 13 presents. When Average
person with fire extinguisher is  used  as  a  fire  department  proficiency,  the  probability  of
flashover and/or boundary penetration is obtained for a big number of spaces, which did not
obtain  probability  with  fire  department  proficiency  of Average department. This was ex-
pected, as an Average department can suppress fires with very high probability, which an
Average person with fire extinguisher cannot.
Table 13. Effect of fire brigade proficiency.
FLASHOVER FAIL 60 FAIL 30 FAIL 15
Sum of probability/index change 0,0462 0,0074 0,0084 0,0074
Average percentual probability change of
individual spaces
0,5171 0,0327 0,2190 0,2226
Outcome of the sensitivity study
The sensitivity analysis was performed in order to investigate the effect of the variables in
the model. The main purpose was to ensure that changes in the value of the variable would
result in a predictable change of the results. Here, predictability includes the assumption that
the results changes in the correct direction. For example, as proved by the sensitivity analy-
sis, higher probability of the functioning of the sprinklers leads to a result of less flashovers
and boundary penetrations. Less flashovers and less boundary penetrations then, on the other
hand, lead to a higher FRI score.
All other variables functioned as intended and predicted, except the fuel load density, which
needs further investigation.
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7 Future improvements
As the most important aspect of this thesis was to develop a functioning model rather than
implement the best available techniques and processes for individual aspects of the model,
the corners had to be cut in multiple places. The topics, which should first be addressed in
future development are discussed in this chapter. Below, the improvements in PFS and RM
are divided in their own sub-chapters for the ease of reading.
A common drawback for both PFS and RM, is that both are Excel based. In PFS workbook
VBA macros are an issue, as they limit the calculation speed. Also, the row count in Excel
becomes a limiting factor, which leads to a need for multiple PFS workbooks. In RM, refer-
ences to imported database on multiple different sheets are needed. The way that Excel pro-
cesses these is extremely slow, and the loading times of the workbook when the full database
is in use, are unacceptable.
Due to the abovementioned reasons, building the model with another software or with a
suitable programming language, would be a major improvement. One possible approach
could be designing a specific NAPA manager for this application. The use of NAPA would
be preferable, as the data for the model are mostly obtained from NAPA. As a side-benefit,
the model could be easily updated, when the ship design progresses or changes, without the
need to change parameters manually in RM or PFS.
The largest issue, which should be considered carefully when choosing the software plat-
form, based on which the model would be updated, is the execution of the LHS sampler.
Developing a correctly working LHS sampler is a major task, and some available platforms
might not be suited for it. Also, the platform should enable fast calculation speed and a big
number of iterations, from where specific data are saved. In addition, the mathematical parts
of the model should be easily modifiable.
7.1 PFS future improvements
Should it be of desire to develop the model in a more realistic direction, the most obvious
future improvement is to validate the outcomes of the fire scenarios. Now, proven formulae
are used to model the compartment fire, but whether occurrences of flashovers and boundary
penetrations are realistic, they are not validated. This validation process should include in-
depth review of real-life fires, their consequences and an extensive number of CFD analyses
of fires within different types of spaces onboard cruise ships.
As stated in section 4, the formulae designed to model fully grown fires and flashovers are
not verified to be used in complex large spaces. Currently, in practice, CFD simulations are
the only way to assess fire growth in such spaces. If new formulae or other methods become
available, they should be utilized in PFS. Another option could be to exclude the large spaces
from the simulations and to give them qualitative score based on expert judgement.
In the mathematical model, which is used for calculation of temperature in the initial space,
the effective heat transfer coefficient hk plays a large role. Thus, a realistic value for hk is
desirable. The value of hk should be made temperature depended. Currently, hk is time de-
pended, which is not fully realistic, as the heat loss through the walls depends on the tem-
perature difference between the wall elements and the room temperature. If the hk would be
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made temperature depended, different hk development  curves  for  different  size  of  spaces
might not be needed. This is due to the fact that the average temperature within a compart-
ment is proportional to the energy that the fire has released. Heat transfer to a steel bulkhead
or to a deck is depended, besides the fire properties, on the insulation class of the steel mem-
ber. Thus, different hk development curves should be developed for different insulation clas-
ses.
Currently, fire is assumed to spread to adjacent spaces, when the temperature on the cold
side of the bulkhead or a deck reaches 160 °C. This is a conservative assumption, as most
materials and items found onboard a ship do not ignite at such temperatures. Another point
is that an item should be in contact with the bulkhead or deck in order to be exposed to such
temperatures. If the item is not directly in touch with the bulkhead or a deck, the heat is lost
in radiation and convection. The limit was set to 160 °C, as no data were available for insu-
lation performance and cold side temperature development beyond the SOLAS require-
ments. To make fire spread to adjacent spaces more realistic, cold side temperature devel-
opment with different types of insulations should be studied. The best approach would be to
conduct actual burning tests and some CFD simulations with different types of fires and
scenarios. As a goal to reach different cold side temperatures, a time-temperature product of
the fire in the initial space should be recorded. This way, the results would be easy to update
in the model.
Compartment temperature decay after the fire has started to decay, should be refined. The
current mathematical model allows compartment temperature to start to decay simultane-
ously with the fire. In reality, the temperature decay starts sometime after the start of decay
of the fire. Changes in the mathematical model is not a difficult task, but a reasonable way
to predict when the temperature decay starts, was not found. A possible approach could be
to simulate different types of compartment fires and to record the decay of fire and the decay
of temperature. From the results, a suitable mathematical model should then be derived.
The probability of success in fire suppression by the crew’s firefighting brigade is depended
on the flame/heat area at the time of intervention. This approach was obtained from land-
based applications and research. The method of predicting flame/heat area at the time of
intervention is based on pool fire. No better alternative was available, thus the pool fire ap-
proach was used, even though it is not a realistic representation of a compartment fire. The
main problem of this approach is that it is designed to predict outdoor pool fires. As of, it
does not take into account more effective radiative heat flux from a ceiling boundary of a
compartment, which accelerate fire development and largens the flame/heat area. To combat
this issue in the model, a more suitable approach of determining the flame/heat area should
be implemented. Another alternative would be to study the topic in more detail and develop
some sort of fire escalation factor, which would represent the more rapid fire development
in a compartment versus an outdoor pool fire.
Relating to the above-discussed topic, four plausible performance levels for the crew fire-
fighting team are available in the model. Probabilities of success of suppression with a given,
encountered fire/flame area are obtained from land-based statistics. These statistics might
not represent truthfully the performance of the shipboard fire brigade performance. Land-
based fire departments can be assumed to be more proficient in actual firefighting, as
onboard a ship, a part of the crew is educated for firefighting purposes, besides their other
tasks.  On the  other  hand,  onboard  a  ship,  the  crew fully  knows the  site,  and  has  detailed
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strategies to combat different kinds of fires onboard. Also, water is mostly available from
multiple directions and boundary cooling, for example, should be easily organized. Also, the
time to reach the fire site varies less onboard a ship. The longest reach times of land-based
departments are not faced onboard a ship. Due to these and multiple other differences be-
tween land-based and shipboard firefighters, the comparison of proficiencies is a difficult
task. A way to compare the proficiencies would be to compare shipboard success of fire-
fighters as a function of heat/flame area to those of the land-based fire fighters. Unfortu-
nately,  such data are not available.  If  such data would become available,  comparison and
refinement could be done. Themelis et al. [23] used a reduction factory for land-based per-
formance figures. These were not implemented into this model due to the lack of reasoning
and evidence.
The sensitivity study regarding fuel load density resulted in some unexpected results, which
should be assessed in more detail. The assumption was that as the fuel load density increases,
so does the probability of flashover and boundary penetrations. In the sensitivity study, prob-
abilities of flashover and boundary penetrations decreased with the highest fuel load. Due to
time restrictions, an in-depth root cause analysis could not be done, and any simple answer
was not found.
7.2 RM future improvements
In the resilience module, attribute weights were generated from numeric pairwise compari-
sons, which were done by the same professionals, who participated in the first part of the
questionnaire. As discussed before, consistency ratios of comparisons conducted by individ-
ual attendees were not satisfactory. In reality, the proposed 10 % margin is most probably
unattainable. However, in the future development, some iteration in matrix generation would
be most definitely desirable. Only two out of nine attendees attained a consistency ratio be-
low 10 %, the rest were higher, and some were considerably higher. Iteration should be fo-
cused on the evaluations with the highest inconsistencies. Iteration should be done, of course,
by the original answerer. If the greatest inconsistencies would be revisited and more con-
sistent comparisons were to be achieved, the overall consistency between the individual
comparisons would be better. This would lead to more reliable attribute weight values.
The amount of combustible materials is an important factor in fire simulation. In the case of
compartment fires, it mainly determines how long the fire lasts before it starts to decay, if
no suppressive actions against the fire are taken. The length of the fire becomes an important
factor, when automatic suppression fails to activate or fails to suppress the fire, and the ship
fire brigade fails to suppress the fire. In this case, the length of the fire is a factor of whether
the  fire  will  penetrate  insulated  boundaries  or  not.  For  the  purposes  of  this  thesis,  expert
opinion was used in assigning the average amount of combustibles per square meter within
each SOLAS category. A better way of determining the amount of combustibles within dif-
ferent SOLAS category spaces would be to investigate statistics of the materials and items
in the built ships. With a more accurate amount of combustible materials, more accurate
predictions from fire consequences could be made.
Due to time concerns, a ship-scale evacuation module must be developed as a part of future
work. As evacuation is an important part of the overall fire safety of the ship, a ship-scale
evacuation module must be developed before the model is taken into use, specifically for
comparing the fire safety levels of different ships. For individual space evacuation a simple
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hydraulic model, as presented in this thesis, is sufficient. Also, in the first part of ship-scale
evacuation, a method for assessing evacuation to assembly stations was presented earlier.
The most challenging parts of ship-scale evacuation are embarkation, evacuation from as-
sembly stations to lifeboats and MES. The most reasonable approach would most probably
be, to try to emulate results obtained from the evacuation simulations, as was done with
evacuation to assembly stations. A simple way of presenting the actual reality would be a
much more demanding task. The main issues are, when passengers are leaving the assembly
stations  and  the  actual  passenger  loading  into  lifeboats  or  MES.  There  are  generally  two
strategies used in embarkation. In the first strategy, all passengers are allowed to simultane-
ously proceed freely from the assembly stations to lifeboats or to a MES. In the second strat-
egy, passengers are guided in control groups from the assembly station to lifeboats or to a
MES. Here, both approaches should be built into the model to enable a cruise line specific
approach. The issue in simulating passenger loading into lifeboats or to a MES is that plau-
sible and attained loading speed varies between different lifeboats and MES systems. One
plausible approach could be to just use the loading factor provided by the supplier of the
lifeboat or MES.
The walking speeds, which are used in evacuation module, when calculating the evacuation
time to assembly stations, were obtained from [49]. A more accurate representation of the
results from actual evacuation simulations would be obtained, if the conducted evacuation
simulations were investigated. In future work, the walking speeds should be modified to
match those, which in actual simulations produce the 95-percentile results. This would re-
quire investigation of evacuation simulations from multiple different ships. From the ob-
tained walking speed, an average should be derived, which could then be used in the model.
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8  Summary
A need for a tool, which could be used for comparing the overall fire safety levels of different
ships and to quantify the change in the fire safety level of a ship, when the design is changed,
was recognized. Some previous attempts have been made, but tools or any software have not
been made available. Another problem of previous attempts has been the use of too theoret-
ical approaches for current practical use.
The scope of the thesis was to develop a model in order to holistically evaluate the cruise
ship fire safety and to identify the main attributes, which would be needed for such a model.
One important aspect was also the ease of use and the ease of obtaining the initial space
attributes of the ship to be analyzed.
In  the  early  phase  of  the  master’s  thesis  process,  it  was  decided,  that  initial  ship  specific
space information should be obtained from the NAPA model of the ship. Applicable macros
were created to enable exportation of the needed attributes to Excel. This enables easy and
fast exportation of initial space data of the ship under evaluation. As the process is fast for-
ward, updates in the design are also easy to import to the model.
After evaluating different plausible approaches to build such a model, fire risk indexing was
chosen. Fire risk indexing offers an easy way of coupling quantitative and qualitative attrib-
utes, which was an important aspect regarding the topic. The model itself is constructed from
three modules; fire safety, evacuation and resilience. The overall performance of the ship
under evaluation is the combined score from each module. The fire safety module assesses
the probability of such a fire, where at least the initial space would be lost. The evacuation
module assesses the evacuation of the whole ship. It should be mentioned, that the finalizing
of the evacuation module was left out for future work due to difficulty in assessing reliably
the embarkation phase. The resilience module assesses the ships’ capabilities of surviving
large fires where one or two main fire zones are lost.
The most effort was used in the development of the fire module. An approach, where two
workbooks are used was adopted. The risk model workbook includes all three modules and
is used to evaluate each space onboard and to form risk values. The probabilistic fire simu-
lator workbook is used to simulate different design fires with ship specific parameters. These
results are then imported to the risk model workbook, where the fire safety module utilizes
the results from the simulations in order to derive space specific fire safety scores. One no-
ticeable issue observed during the model development was that the calculation speed of Ex-
cel is slow in tasks needed for the model. This results in long simulation times in the proba-
bilistic fire simulator and in long updates in the risk model. However, as the model includes
two workbooks, in the case of one ship project, only one set of simulations with probabilistic
fire simulator is needed, as changes in the space attributes of the ship can be imported straight
from NAPA to the risk model. This way, the implementation of design-changes takes only
minutes, once the initial model is created.
A case study was performed using a modern cruise ferry. In the case study, the evacuation
module was disabled due to the lack of an embarkation module, and risk weight values were
changed accordingly. The purpose of the case study was to test the model and to ensure the
functioning of the fire safety and the resilience modules in realistic application. Apart from
the longer than expected calculation times, the model worked as intended.
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After the case study, a sensitivity study was performed. The scope of the sensitivity study
was to verify that changes in the variable parameter would affect the end result in a reason-
able and predicted manner. Some surprising results were obtained when the fuel load density
was varied, which needs further investigation. Changes in other parameters affected the out-
come as expected.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Questionnaire answer template. 2 pages.
Appendix 2. Comparison template. 1 page.
Appendix 1 (1/2)
Appendix 1. Questionnaire answer template
Most important items or features to preserve during or after a large fire (1-2
MVZ) onboard a cruise ship
Example
Item or feature: Availability of lifeboats
Why is this item or feature important: If conditions onboard the ship become worse,
evacuation using lifeboats might become necessary.
What affects preservation of this item or feature: Longitudinal distribution of lifeboats.
1. Item or feature:
Why is this item or feature important:
What affects preservation of this item or feature:
2. Item or feature:
Why is this item or feature important:
What affects preservation of this item or feature:
3. Item or feature:
Why is this item or feature important:
What affects preservation of this item or feature:
4. Item or feature:
Why is this item or feature important:
What affects preservation of this item or feature:
5. Item or feature:
Why is this item or feature important:
What affects preservation of this item or feature:
6. Item or feature:
Why is this item or feature important:
What affects preservation of this item or feature:
Appendix 1 (2/2)
7. Item or feature:
Why is this item or feature important:
What affects preservation of this item or feature:
8. Item or feature:
Why is this item or feature important:
What affects preservation of this item or feature:
9. Item or feature:
Why is this item or feature important:
What affects preservation of this item or feature:
10. Item or feature:
Why is this item or feature important:
What affects preservation of this item or feature:
Appendix 2 (1/1)
Appendix 2. Comparison template
Intensity of importance on an
absolute scale
1
3
5
7
9
2.4.6.8
A If A is moreimportant than B
If B is more
important than A
Emergency power
Emergency power
Emergency power
Emergency power
Emergency power
Emergency power
Fire fighting systems
Fire fighting systems
Fire fighting systems
Fire fighting systems
Fire fighting systems
Availability of LSA
Availability of LSA
Availability of LSA
Availability of LSA
Crew emergency education/skills
Crew emergency education/skills
Crew emergency education/skills
Internal communications
Internal communications
External communications
Fire main availability & capacity
Fire main availability & capacity
Fire main availability & capacity
Internal communications
External communications
Fire main availability & capacity
External communications
External communications
Fire main availability & capacity
Crew emergency education/skills
Internal communications
External communications
External communications
Fire main availability & capacity
Availability of LSA
Crew emergency education/skills
Internal communications
B
Fire fighting systems
Availability of LSA
Crew emergency education/skills
Internal communications
Very strong importance
Extreme importance
Intermediate values between the two
adjacent judgements
The evidence favoring one activity ove
another is of the highest possible order of
affirmation
An activity is strongly favored and its
dominance demonstrated in practice
Comparisons
Intensity scales
Experience and judgment strongly favour one
activity over another
When compromise is needed
Definitions
Equal importance
Moderate importance of one over another
Essential or strong importance
Experience and judgment strongly favour one
activity over another
Two activities contribute equally to the
objective
Explanation
